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SENTENCING FACTS AFTER BOOKER
I. INTRODUCTION
The maxim that judges do not decide questions of fact and juries
do not decide questions of law is probably as old as the common
law.1 Like most maxims, it is not true-at least not all the time. No
neat line divides questions of law from questions of fact, and even
if one did, we could not practicably assign all questions in one
category to judges and all questions in the other to juries. Adjudica-
tion is never that simple. Judges always have and always will
decide some questions of fact; juries always have and always will
decide some questions of law.2
Nevertheless, it is true that there is something about certain
questions that leads us to conclude that they are factual and, in
turn, to assign them to the jury. For civil cases in the federal courts,
the Constitution expressly refers to the jury's central role as fact-
finder by providing that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law."3 The first Judiciary Act was even
more clear, providing that "the trial of issues in fact, in the district
courts, in all causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, shall be by jury."4 And today, courts routinely invoke
the fact-law distinction as a rationale for assigning a particular
decision either to the jury or to the judge.
In the realm of criminal sentencing, however, the principle that
juries should decide questions of fact got lost in the second half of
the twentieth century. As legislatures turned to structured
sentencing schemes to reduce perceived disparities in sentencing,
they assigned more and more fact-finding to judges. This fact-
finding was done after the defendant's guilt for a particular crime
had been established, either through guilty plea or conviction. It
typically involved a determination by a preponderance of the
SSIR EDWARD COKE, COMMENTARY ON LITTLETON 460 (Thomas ed. 1818) ("[Ald
questionem facti non respondentjudices... ad quaestionemjuris non respondent juratores.").
2 See Daniel D. Blinka, "This Germ of Rottedness": Federal Trials in the New Republic,
1789-1807, at 36 CREIGHTON L. REv. 135, 138-39 (2003) (discussing questions of fact and law
during 1790s).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
4 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
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evidence standard made on the basis of a presentence investigation
conducted by a probation officer. Judges, acting without the benefit
of evidentiary hearings, decided such clearly factual determinations
as the amount of money embezzled,5 whether an assault was
motivated by pecuniary gain,6 and whether the victim of sexual
abuse was in the custody of the abuser.7 Substantial differences in
actual time served turned on the outcome.
The Supreme Court allowed-indeed, encouraged-this process.'
The Court understood the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial
in criminal cases simply not to apply at sentencing s The Court
embraced a distinction between the "elements" of an offense and
mere "sentencing factors," requiring a jury determination on any
matter labeled an element, but not requiring one for mere sentenc-
ing factors.' ° And it gave legislatures almost total deference to
define the elements of an offense, and thus to transfer fact-finding
authority to the judge."
That began to change with the Court's decision in Apprendi v.
New Jersey, in which the Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of
5 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1. 1(b)(3) (2004) (providing for increase
in offense level for larceny, embezzlement, or theft based on amount of loss); cf id.
§ 2A2.2(b)(3) (providing for increase in offense level for aggravated assault based on degree
of bodily injury to victim).
6 See id. § 2A2.2(b)(4) (providing for increase in offense level for aggravated assault
where "assault was motivated by a payment or offer of money or other thing of value").
7 See id. § 2A3. 1(b)(3) (providing for increase in offense level for criminal sexual abuse
based on whether victim was in custody or care of defendant or was abducted).
8 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-49 (1949) (citing practical reasons for
allowing judicial fact-finding during sentencing).
9 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) ("The Sixth Amendment never has
been thought to guarantee a right to a jury determination of [the appropriate punishment to
be imposed on an individual].").
10 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998) ("An indictment
must set forth each element of the crime ... [but] it need not set forth factors relevant only
to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime."); McMillan v. Pennsylva-
nia, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) ("[Tlhe Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which
the defendant is charged." (emphasis in original) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 210 (1977))).
" See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85 (stating that "the state legislature's definition of the
elements of the offense is usually dispositive") (citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210); Larry
Alexander, The Supreme Court, Dr. Jekyll, and the Due Process of Proof, 1996 SuP. CT. REV.
191, 196 (1996) ("The state's formal definitions of crimes largely control when the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt can be reduced or shifted to the defendant.").
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SENTENCING FACTS AFTER BOOKER
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. " 12 Apprendi turned the
analysis of the right to a jury trial away from the semantic distinc-
tion between elements and sentencing factors and toward the
defendant's real concerns about the severity of the penalty to be
imposed. 3 For that reason, it was a significant decision. But
because it seemingly did not touch the issue of judicial fact-finding
unless the factual determinations resulted in a sentence greater
than the prescribed statutory maximum, its scope appeared limited.
Most notably, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines")
appeared immune from challenge under Apprendi because they
expressly provide that any sentence imposed under them may not
exceed the statutorily authorized maximum sentence. 4
With its decision in Blakely v. Washington,5 however, the
Supreme Court appeared to take the logic ofApprendi to its natural
conclusion. Blakely extended Apprendi by defining the "statutory
maximum" referred to in Apprendi as "the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant."6 In other words, Blakely
appeared to hold that any factual determination that operates to
increase the maximum sentence to which the defendant is subject
must be admitted by the defendant or made by the jury."' That was,
to say the least, an extraordinary holding. It called into question
not just the Guidelines, but any sentencing scheme that calls on the
12 530 U.S. 466,490(2000). The defendant inApprendi was convicted of a crime carrying
a maximum sentence often years. Id. at 470. But he was sentenced to twelve years based
on the sentencing judge's determination under New Jersey's hate-crime statute that he had
acted "with a purpose to intimidate... because of race." Id. at 469-71.
'3 See id. at 478-79 (noting that at founding of United States, any possible distinction
between element and sentencing factor was unknown; instead, criminal procedure gave little
discretion to trial judge so that defendant had no doubt what punishment would follow
particular crime).
14 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(c) (2004) ("[The sentence may be
imposed at any point within the applicable guideline range, provided [it] ... is not greater
than the statutorily authorized maximum sentence. . .
16 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
16 Id. at 2537 (emphasis in original).
17 Id. ("When a judge inflicts punishment that thejury's verdict alone does not allow, the
jury has not found all the facts 'which the law makes essential to the punishment,' and the
judge exceeds his proper authority." (citation omitted)).
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judge to make findings of fact as a prelude to determining a
sentence.18 It sowed so much confusion among the courts that the
Supreme Court took the unusual step of granting certiorari during
its summer recess to allow expedited review of two cases addressing
the constitutionality of the Guidelines. 9
The Court's decision in those cases, reported as United States v.
Booker,2 ° is convoluted even by the standards of this increasingly
fractured Court. It contains two majority opinions, one that holds
that judicial fact-finding under the Guidelines may violate the Sixth
Amendment 2 and a second that provides a remedy.22 Justice
Ginsburg signed on to both opinions, but otherwise there is no
overlap among the justices in the two majorities.23 The four justices
(other than Ginsburg) who found the Guidelines constitutionally
infirm rejected the second majority's remedy, and the four justices
(other than Ginsburg) who crafted the remedy rejected the first
majority's conclusions that the Guidelines could be applied unconsti-
tutionally.
The result is a decision containing a fundamental internal
inconsistency. The first majority reaffirmed Blakely's holding that
"[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to
support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by
the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."24
Because, in at least some cases, the Guidelines call for judges to find
facts that increase the range of sentences to which the defendant is
subject, the first majority found the Guidelines unconstitutional as
applied in those cases.2" But the second majority concluded that any
is Id. at 2549 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (concluding that Blakely "casts constitutional
doubt over [all determinate sentencing schemes] and, in so doing, threatens an untold number
of criminal judgments").
19 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 11, 11 (2004); United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct.
12, 12 (2004).
20 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
21 Id. at 746.
22 Id. at 756.
23 Id. at 746,756 (listing first majority as Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg,
JJ., and second majority as Breyer, O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, JJ., and Rehnquist, C.J.).
24 Id. at 756.
26 Id. at 746-48. Although the first majority never expressly declared the Guidelines
unconstitutional, it agreed with the holding of the Seventh Circuit in Booker that the
900 [Vol. 39:895
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constitutional infirmity could be expunged if the Guidelines were
construed as advisory rather than mandatory.26 The second
majority's remedy, therefore, was simply to excise the statutory
language making the Guidelines mandatory, while leaving the basic
structure of the Guidelines intact and expecting judges to continue
to apply them essentially as drafted.27
The incomprehensible product of these two opinions is that if a
judge finds facts increasing a defendant's sentence beyond the
otherwise allowable maximum because Congress required her to
find those facts, the resulting sentence is unconstitutional. On the
other hand, if a judge finds facts increasing a defendant's sentence
beyond the otherwise allowable maximum because Congress
suggested that she find those facts, the sentence is perfectly valid.
What apparently matters to this Court is not whether judges
remove crucial fact-finding authority from juries, but whether
judges remove crucial fact-finding authority from juries because
Congress has required them to do so.
It seems safe to say that the drafters of the Sixth Amendment
would not have seen the issue in those terms. They were more
concerned about judicial usurpations of power than about legislative
usurpations of power. The abridgment by imperial judges of the
right to a jury trial was one of the key grievances leading to the
American Revolution.2" Both the first Continental Congress 29 and
the Declaration of Independence" expressly referred to efforts to
curtail the right in justifying the push for independence. Through-
out prerevolutionary and then preconstitutional debates, there was
never a suggestion that judges should be allowed to remove
decisional authority from juries as long as they did so in their own
Guidelines had been unconstitutionally applied by the district court in that case. Id.
26 Id. at 756-57.
27 See id. at 764-65 (noting that remainder ofact "functions independently" ofthat which
violates Sixth Amendment).
28 See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("The friends and adversaries of the plan of the [constitutional] convention, if they agree on
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury. ").
29 1 JOURNALS OFTHE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1774-1789, at 69 (Worthington Chauncey
Ford ed., 1904) (resolving to adopt English common law, including "privilege of being tried
by... peers").
30 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
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discretion. From an originalist perspective, the Court's joint holding
is unsupportable.
But Booker is problematic for a more fundamental reason rooted
in the pragmatic concerns of real-world defendants. It takes a
significant step back from the progress the Court had made in
recent years toward a reinvigorated jury right. Depending on how
Congress responds to the decision, Booker will likely allow judicial
fact-finding under the Guidelines and their state counterparts to
continue unchecked, with real differences in time served turning on
the findings of judges and not juries. That result is troubling for
several reasons, and in this Article I will focus on one reason that
has received relatively little attention: the disparity the Court's
jury-right decisions has produced between what a civil litigant can
expect his jury to decide and what a criminal litigant can expect his
jury to decide."'
Notwithstanding some fundamental and well-known differences
in criminal and civil procedure, 2 in most respects the criminal jury
right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and the civil jury right
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment have been implemented in
coordinate fashion. The two types ofjuries are drawn from the same
pools, 3  they are subject to similar guidelines regarding
composition34 and selection, 5 and the manner in which they receive
evidence and instruction on the law, deliberate, and render verdicts
"1 See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DuKE L.J. 951, 968-74 (2003)
(comparing jury rights under Sixth and Seventh Amendments); Colleen P. Murphy,
Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
723, 726 (1993) (proposing integrated theory of jury authority).
32 See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 15 (2003) (describing
difference between criminal and civil trials, including privilege against self incrimination and
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof).
33 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (2000) (setting forth procedure and policy for jury
selection).
m See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973) (holding that federal civil jury may
consist of six persons); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (holding that state
criminal jury may consist of six persons).
" See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (holding that peremptory
challenges may not be used to exclude women from criminal jury); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (holding that peremptory challenges may not be used
to exclude black jurors in civil actions solely because of race); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79,89 (1986) (holding that use of peremptory challenges on black jurors solelybecause of race
violated equal protection rights of criminal defendant and jurors); JONAKAIT, supra note 32,
at 128-34 (describing state and federal voir dire practices).
[Vol. 39:895902
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is the same. To be sure, because of the greater liberty concerns
implicated by criminal trials, there are important differences in the
standard of proof required to reach a verdict and in the power of the
judge to overrule that verdict.36 And while the value of criminal
juries seems beyond question, the civil jury has been subjected to
steady criticism.37 But at bottom, criminal and civil juries have been
understood to have similar societal functions, including checking the
abuse of governmental power, determining disputed facts, injecting
community values into legal decisions, and aiding public acceptance
of legal determinations." They are, as a consequence, subject to
similar procedural incidents.
With its decision in Booker cementing judicial power to find facts
at sentencing, however, the Supreme Court has ensured an
enduring disparity between the kinds of questions criminal and civil
litigants can expect their juries to decide. The disparity appears
most dramatically by comparing the assessment of punitive
damages in civil cases with the imposition of a sentence in criminal
cases. Both civil punitive awards and criminal sentences turn on
factual considerations, such as the degree of harm inflicted on
victims.39 The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that, where
punitive damages are at issue in a civil case, the jury should make
any factual determinations on which the award of punitive damages
turns.4 ° In contrast, Booker will permit judges acting under the
newly advisory Guidelines to determine exactly the same factual
matters, such as the degree of harm to the victim, as a predicate for
imposing a criminal sentence.
A discrepancy between the scope of the jury rights under the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments would not seem unusual if it
36 See JONAKAIT, supra note 32, at 248-50 (explaining jury nullification).
"7 See generally VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993)
(collecting articles by scholars critiquing civil jury system).
3 JONAKAIT, supra note 32, at 18-86.
39 See infra notes 231-51 (comparing methodologies for determining punitive damage
awards and criminal sentences).
" See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 n.12 (2001)
(noting that Seventh Amendment would not permit court to ignore jury findings when
reviewing punitive damages); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340,355
(1998) (holding that Seventh Amendment guarantees "right to a jury trial on all issues
pertinent to an award of statutory damages under § 504(c) of the Copyright Act").
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resulted in a more expansive right for criminal defendants. After
all, criminal defendants enjoy added protections from the right to
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the possibility ofjury nullifica-
tion.4 ' But in the allocation of decisionmaking responsibility, the
Supreme Court's Sixth and Seventh Amendment jurisprudence has
not created a more expansive jury right for criminal defendants.
Instead, it has produced a system in which a civil litigant may
demand a jury decision on questions that, if presented in a criminal
case, would fall within the exclusive province of the judge.
This Article explores this anomaly and argues that the Supreme
Court in Booker missed a critical opportunity to redress the
constriction of the criminal defendant's right to have a jury decide
those facts that lead to the deprivation of the defendant's liberty.
There is simply no good reason to ensure that civil litigants get a
jury decision on all questions of fact relevant to the imposition of a
civil award while denying similar protection to criminal defendants
facing imprisonment or even death. As an initial matter, both the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments arguably should be understood to
give constitutional force to a jury right as it existed at the framing."
The black-letter rule of common-law procedure at that time was that
juries decide questions of fact and judges decide questions of law.
In fact, the evidence suggests that fine distinctions between fact and
law were seldom drawn and that juries were given broad latitude to
decide all issues in a case, legal or factual.43 Nevertheless, it seems
to have been widely understood that judges could not take factual
determinations away from the jury.' Thus, to the extent they
incorporate procedural standards from the time of the founding, the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments should both be understood to
require jury decisions on all relevant questions of fact.
41 See JONAKAIT, supra note 32, at 248-49 (attributing added protection of jury
nullification to Fifth Amendment).
42 See Murphy, supra note 31, at 745 (noting that general language of Seventh
Amendment incorporates historical practice).
' See Blinka, supra note 2, at 138-39 (stating juries could even decide cases without
regard to instructions by judges or testimony of witnesses).
4 See JACKH.FRIEDENTHAL ETAL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 496 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing roles
of judge and jury at common law). Judges did play a role in the fact-finding process, for
example, by commenting on the witnesses and on the evidence. Id.
[Vol. 39:895904
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Beyond this argument rooted in logical consistency and original
intent, there are powerful normative reasons for giving fact
questions to the jury. As our system has implicitly recognized for
centuries, juries are simply the best actors to decide fact questions.45
Fact questions involve speculative judgments about unknown
events. In order to allow the parties and the legal system to put
disputes behind them, adjudication must result in final determina-
tions about the matters contested by the parties. Only the jury,
with its veiled, democratic decisionmaking structure, has the
societal imprimatur to render acceptable final decisions on matters
that are inherently unknowable. Accordingly, even for those who do
not subscribe to an originalist conception of constitutional rights,
the Sixth and Seventh Amendments should be read to guarantee
that juries decide questions of fact, whether those questions arise in
connection with establishing liability or in connection with deter-
mining the appropriate award or punishment.
My argument on these points will proceed in three steps. In Part
II, I will trace the evolution of the criminal jury right to show how
the jury's role was constricted prior to the partial recovery of jury
power in the Apprendi line of cases. In Part III, I will trace the
parallel evolution of the civil jury right to show how it has remained
fairly consistent in requiring jury decisions on important fact
questions. In Part IV, I will demonstrate the consequences of this
disparity by comparing the scope of the civil jury right as it is
applied to punitive damages to the scope of the criminal jury right
as it is applied to sentencing. In Part V, I will explain why, as a
normative matter, it makes sense to give questions of fact to the
jury, and then I will address the practical implications of interpret-
ing the Sixth Amendment to confer a right to a jury decision on
questions of fact at sentencing.
" See Murphy, supra note 31, at 745 ("[T]he Founders preferred the jury to judge because
they believed the jury to be a more rational factfinder, a body less susceptible to bias, and a
vital check on official power.").
90520051
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II. THE SCOPE OF THE JuRY RIGHT IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. THE CRIMINAL JURY'S HISTORICAL PREROGATIVES
One of the ways in which royal courts attempted to rein in the
jury right during the colonial period was by the use of special
verdicts; that is, verdicts in which the jury determines the facts of
the case and the judge applies the governing legal principles to those
facts. The most famous example of that practice, and in fact the
case that effectively doomed the practice in America, was the failed
prosecution of John Peter Zenger for the crime of seditious libel in
1735.46 Zenger was the editor and printer of The New York Weekly
Journal, the first paper devoted to political commentary in the
colonies.47 There was little question that Zenger's criticisms fit the
existing standards for sedition.48 Nevertheless, three separate
grand juries refused to indict him.49 He finally faced trial after the
New York Attorney General charged him in an information. 0
At trial, Zenger was represented by Andrew Hamilton, the
leading lawyer in colonial America.5' Hamilton conceded that
Zenger had published the statements charged, but argued-contrary
to the clear law of the day-that truth was a defense and that it
should be submitted to the jury.52 The presiding judge responded
that the only issue for the jury to decide was the factual one of
whether Zenger published the papers; it was then up to the judge to
determine whether the publication constituted libel.53 Hamilton
disagreed. "I know they have the right beyond all dispute to
determine both the law and the fact, and where they do not doubt
of the law, they ought to do so .... [Lleaving it to the judgment of
the Court whether the words are libelous or not in effect renders
Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 871 (1994).
47 Id. at 872.
48 Id.
49 Id.
N Id.
51 Id. at 872-73.
52 Id. at 873.
53 Id.
906 [Vol. 39:895
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juries useless ...... The judge ultimately allowed the jury to
render a general verdict, and the jury found Zenger not guilty.55
The Zenger case helped enshrine the power of colonial criminal
juries to render general verdicts encompassing both law and fact. 6
That understanding of the jury's prerogatives prevailed after
independence as well. In Georgia v. Brailsford, one of the few jury
trials in the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Jay instructed the
jurors that they had the "right to take upon [themiselves to judge of
both [fact and law], and to determine the law as well as the fact in
controversy."57 Later, when Justice Samuel Chase was impeached,
one of the charges against him was that, while sitting as a trial
judge, he had attempted "to wrest from the jury their indisputable
right to hear argument, and determine upon the question of the law,
as well as on the question of fact, involved in the verdict they are
required to give."58 By 1851, at least fifteen states had established,
either by statute or through judicial decision or custom, that juries
had the right to decide questions of law as well as questions of fact.59
During this period, most crimes carried definite sentences.6 ° In
her study of the history of structured sentencing, Professor Ilene H.
Nagel, a former U.S. Sentencing Commissioner, found that
[tihroughout [the colonial] period, and up through 1870,
legislators retained most of the discretionary power over
criminal sentencing. Each crime had a defined punish-
ment; the period of incarceration was generally pre-
scribed with specificity by the legislature. Judges were
given some sentencing discretion, but only within ranges
that were narrow compared to later developments. 6'
Id. (alteration in original).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 873-75 (noting that pamphlet describing Zenger's trial "became the American
primer on the role and duties ofjurors" and discussing cases in which juries rendered verdicts
contrary to apparently governing legal rules).
57 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794).
's Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 46, at 908.
59 Id. at 910.
o See Ilene H. Nagel, Forward: Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New
Commissioner, 80 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 883,892 (discussing criminal sentencing during
colonial period through 1870).
61 Id. (citations omitted).
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Federal judges had wider discretion than state judges at that time,
but federal judges played a comparatively small role in the overall
sentencing scheme because of the narrow range of federal crimes. 2
As a result of these two factors-juries' right to decide legal
questions and the determinacy of sentencing-there was little
reason to debate the scope of the jury right in criminal cases. Juries
decided virtually all disputed questions of fact and many questions
of law as well. Even where crimes did not carry definite sentences,
juries frequently made sentencing decisions.63
But that began to change in the mid-1800s. Although courts
came to reject the notion that jurors should decide questions of
law,64 American jurisdictions continued to disallow special verdicts
in criminal cases. 65 With general verdicts protected by the uniform
view that judges could not direct a guilty verdict or overturn an
acquittal, juries continued to have de facto power to decide questions
of law (at least when favoring the defendant) in criminal cases.66
With respect to criminal sentencing, however, the law began to
change in a way that dramatically decreased the power ofjuries. As
reform-minded legislatures gradually codified or recodified their
states' criminal laws, they changed the way criminal punishments
were determined in two major respects. First, the new legislation
replaced multifarious crimes with statutory schemes whereby a
single basic crime was punishable by different penalties depending
on the presence of aggravating circumstances.6" Second, reflecting
6 See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 312-14 (2000) (discussing
history ofjudicial sentencing discretion in federal versus state courts).
6 See id. at 311-12 (noting historical prevalence ofjury sentencing).
' See Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895) (holding that jury may not resolve
disputes of law); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 46, at 910 (noting that between 1850 and 1931,
courts in at least eleven states held that juries do not have power to decide questions of law).
6 See JONAKAIT, supra note 32, at 251 ("Federal and state courts usually do not allow
special verdicts or special interrogatories if the criminal defendant objects to their use.").
Despite the overwhelming preference for general verdicts, American courts have on occasion
allowed special verdicts in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385,
392 (9th Cir. 1976) (arguing on appeal that use of special verdict resulted in prejudice in
conviction for conspiracy to engage in exportation of arms).
6 See JONAKAIT, supra note 32, at 245, 250 ("Juries have the power to disregard the law
and acquit a guilty defendant, a power commonly labeled 'jury nullification.' ").
67 This process began in the late nineteenth century but reached fruition with the
promulgation of the Model Penal Code in 1962, which unified and simplified multiple criminal
908 [Vol. 39:895
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contemporary notions about penal reform,6 most penalty provisions
were modified to give judges discretion to set sentences within broad
penalty ranges.69 Those sentences were typically indeterminate,
with the actual sentence determined later by a parole board after
some part of the sentence had been served."v
Although the evidence is incomplete at best, it appears from the
reported decisions that most courts faced with the first type of
innovation concluded that the aggravating facts were part of the
crime that had to be pleaded in the indictment and proved to the
jury.7' In other words, where a legislature had expressly spelled out
matters for decision bearing on the defendant's culpability, these
courts assumed that it would be juries and not judges who made
those decisions.
With respect to the second type of innovation, courts and
commentators seem to have failed to recognize the potential for
incursion into the jury's traditional bailiwick. That fact can
probably be explained by two considerations. First, the reforms were
intended to reduce the severity of sentencing.72 The idea was to
offenses into a few broad, general categories. See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF
JUDGING 24-25 (1998) (discussing place of Model Penal Code in history of sentencing reform).
The Model Penal Code converted many of the factors that had formerly been elements of
discrete crimes into sentencing considerations that a court could take into account at the
sentencing stage. Id. at 25-26.
" See id. at 17 ("By the middle of the nineteenth century, these early theories of reform
through isolation or hard labor-through court-ordered suffering-gave way under the weight
of failure to a new understanding of rehabilitation."); Nagel, supra note 60, at 893 (noting
late-nineteenth century shift in attitudes from retributive to rehabilitative theory of
punishment).
69 See Bowman, supra note 62, at 303 (discussing broad discretion of federal judges to set
sentences prior to Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
70 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 67, at 20-22 (discussing historical trends in federal
sentencing). Typically, in the federal system, the judge would sentence the defendant to a
minimum and a maximum, and the defendant could not be paroled until he had served one-
third of the sentence. Id.
71 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 501-09 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(discussing responses of various courts to antebellum changes in criminal law).
72 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249 (1949)
In general, these modern changes [in sentencing] have not resulted in
making the lot of offenders harder. On the contrary a strong motivating
force for the changes has been the belief that by careful study of the lives
and personalities of convicted offenders many could be less severely
punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizenship.
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make sentences flexible so that the offender could be released on
parole when he had been sufficiently rehabilitated.7" Thus, it
probably would not have occurred to anyone to view the changes as
infringing on defendants' jury rights. Second, judges' exercise of
discretion was largely hidden from view. There were few legislative
commands as to the factors to be considered in setting penalties,
and judges were not required to make formal findings justifying
their decisions.74 For that reason, to the extent judges had invaded
the traditional province of the jury, those incursions would have
been difficult to pinpoint and address.
The Supreme Court expressly approved this system, and the
corresponding transfer of sentencing power from juries to judges and
parole authorities, in Williams v. New York.7" In Williams, the jury
found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder but recommended
life imprisonment." The trial judge imposed a sentence of death
based on information obtained through the Parole Department and
never introduced at trial.77 Under New York law, the judge had
discretion to impose the sentence and was encouraged in doing so to
7s Id. at 247-48. Explaining the need for flexibility in sentencing procedures, the Court
characterized innovations in sentencing as follows:
Undoubtedly the New York statutes emphasize a prevalent modern
philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and
not merely the crime. The belief no longer prevails that every offense in
a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to
the past life and habits of a particular offender. This whole country has
traveled far from the period in which the death sentence was an automatic
and commonplace result of convictions-even for offenses today deemed
trivial. Today's philosophy of individualizing sentences makes sharp
distinctions for example between first and repeated offenders. Indetermi-
nate sentences the ultimate termination of which are sometimes decided
by non-judicial agencies have to a large extent taken the place of the old
rigidly fixed punishments. The practice of probation which relies heavily
on non-judicial implementation has been accepted as a wise policy.
Execution of the United States parole system rests on the discretion of an
administrative parole board. Retribution is no longer the dominant
objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders
have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.
Id. (citations omitted).
7' See Bowman, supra note 62, at 303-04 (noting virtually unlimited discretion of judges
to consider sentencing factors so long as final sentence fell within statutory range of
penalties).
75 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
76 Id. at 242.
77 Id.
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consider "information about the convicted person's past life, health,
habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities," including
information obtained outside the courtroom and without confronta-
tion or cross-examination. 8 Extolling the virtues of the then
prevailing rehabilitative model of punishment, the Court approved
this scheme:
In determining whether a defendant shall receive a one-
year minimum or a twenty-year maximum sentence, we
do not think the Federal Constitution restricts the view
of the sentencing judge to the information received in
open court. The due process clause should not be treated
as a device for freezing the evidential procedure of
sentencing in the mold of trial procedure. So to treat the
due process clause would hinder if not preclude all
courts-state and federal-from making progressive
efforts to improve the administration of criminal
justice.79
Thus, as of the 1950s, the Supreme Court interpreted criminal
defendants' trial protections against a background understanding
in which sentencing decisions were presumed to be part of a
"progressive" effort to improve justice. Although the unfortunate
defendant in Williams was sentenced to death, the underlying
assumption was that these progressive sentencing decisions would
be more understanding of and sympathetic to defendants' unique
personal characteristics. With that background understanding, it
is not surprising that the Court allowed more and more fact-finding
authority to be shifted from juries to judges. But that background
understanding was soon undermined by shifts in attitudes about the
efficacy of rehabilitation. Moreover, the impending due process
revolution dramatically increased protections for criminal defen-
dants in other procedural areas, exposing the ever growing gap
between the promise of the criminal jury right and its application in
practice.
78 Id. at 245.
'9 Id. at 251.
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B. THE JURY'S ROLE IN AN ERA OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING
The Supreme Court's complacency about the roles of judge and
jury continued through most of the remaining twentieth century. As
late as 1984, in holding that a Florida judge could constitutionally
override a jury's recommendation against the death sentence, the
Court declared without elaboration that "Itihe Sixth Amendment
never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury determination
[of the appropriate punishment to be imposed on an individual] ."'
But the rapid spread of structured sentencing schemes in the 1980s
changed that. The Court began to understand that the sentencing
phase of a criminal proceeding could not be mechanically separated
from the culpability phase. The seeds of this new approach were
sown in the Court's due process decisions of the 1970s and then
germinated to bear fruit in the Apprendi line of cases at the turn of
the century.
1. The Elements Test. In the seminal case In re Winship, the
Court announced a bedrock principle of criminal law: The prosecu-
tion bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all the
facts that constitute the crime charged."' Winship focused only on
the burden of proof; it did not address the question of who should
decide the various issues raised in a criminal proceeding. But
Winship and its progeny-most importantly Mullaney v.
Wilbur"2 -came to be understood as attaching special significance
to the elements of the crime charged. 3 In effect, the Supreme Court
'o Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984).
8' 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970) ("[Wle explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
82 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Under the Maine statute at issue, both manslaughter and murder
were defined as unlawful and intentional homicide. Id. at 685. Once the prosecution proved
those elements, the defendant was presumed to have acted with malice aforethought, the
additional element required for murder. Id. at 686. To reduce the conviction to manslaugh-
ter, the defendant bore the burden of proving the absence of malice aforethought. Id. The
Supreme Court held that this scheme violated In re Winship's holding that all elements be
proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 703-04.
s' See Alexander, supra note 11, at 192 ("The Court reasoned [in Mullaney] that because
Maine had made malice an element of the crime of murder and defined it to preclude
provoked/heat-of-passion killings, it had violated Winship's requirement that the prosecution
bear the burden of proving the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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gave legislatures and courts wide latitude to alter criminal law
schemes, as long as basic procedural protections regarding the
determination of the elements of the crime charged were retained.84
With the advent of the Guidelines in 1986, as well as the
contemporaneous adoption of statutory sentencing schemes in many
states, the issue that had up to that point remained latent, judicial
fact-finding in sentencing, suddenly rose to the surface. The
Guidelines were expressly intended to reduce judicial discretion,
thought to be too lenient on convicted defendants.8 5 They repre-
sented a return to a retributive model of punishment after the long
ascendancy of the rehabilitative model.8 6 Furthermore, they made
explicit the determinations that went into the calculation of a given
sentence. Judicial fact-finding was no longer either benevolent or
hidden. Consequently, defendants had both the incentive and the
means to challenge postconviction findings.
In the initial cases challenging judicial fact-finding under the
Guidelines and state analogs, the Court gave little indication that
it would find any constitutional infirmity in the new framework of
structured sentencing. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, for example,
the Court upheld a Pennsylvania sentencing statute increasing a
convicted defendant's minimum sentence based upon a trial judge's
determination that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during
" See id. at 196 ("The state's formal definitions of crimes largely control when the burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt can be reduced or shifted to the defendant.").
" See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1938, 1942-43 (1988) (discussing retrenchment of
sentencing reform movement).
' See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9-
10(2003)
The sentencing reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s prompted
America's reconsideration of its penal goals. Initially, this movement
seemed to be about reducing the sentencing disparities that can result
from the differing views and personalities ofjudges. The hawks and the
doves of criminal process both welcomed it. In retrospect, however, the
movement appears to have been a Trojan horse whose procedural facade
concealed the soldiers of substantive change. It proved to be less about
correcting disparities than about radically altering sentencing standards,
deemphasizing the personal characteristics of offenders, substituting
aggregated for individualized sentences, enhancing the power of prosecu-
tors, and increasing the severity of criminal penalties.
20051 913
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:895
a felony.8" It emphasized the distinction between elements and
sentencing factors and deferred to the legislature to define the
elements of an offense.8" The Court concluded that "there is no
Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence
turns on specific findings of fact."89 Having found that the Pennsyl-
vania legislature expressly stated that visible possession of a
firearm was a sentencing factor rather than an element, the Court
held that the right to a jury decision did not apply.9 °
The Court relied on McMillan in Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, which addressed a recidivism provision in the federal
immigration laws.9' The trial judge in Almendarez-Torres had
increased a defendant's sentence based on the judge's determination
at sentencing that the defendant had committed a prior felony.92
The Supreme Court again gave the legislature almost total defer-
ence in defining the elements of an offense.93 Based on its reading
of the statutory text, the legislative history, and the fact that
recidivism is a traditional sentencing factor, the Court had little
trouble finding that Congress intended the provision to operate as
a sentencing factor rather than a separate crime.94 Although the
case did not raise a Sixth Amendment question since the defendant
had waived his right to a jury by pleading guilty, it strongly
suggested that the issue of recidivism was a sentencing factor to
which the right to a jury decision did not apply.
But the Court's certainty began to crack in Jones v. United
States.9" At issue in Jones was the federal carjacking statute, 18
" 477 U.S. 79, 82 n.1 (1986) (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982)).
' Id. at 93. The Court did recognize, however, that a state's choice to define a matter as
a sentencing factor might not be determinative if that factor were so important as to become
"a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense." Id. at 88.
Id. at 93.
9o Id. But see Richard Singer & Mark D. Knoll, Elements and Sentencing Factors: A
Reassessment of the Alleged Distinction, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 203, 203 (2000) (arguing
that importance of "elements-sentencing factors" distinction has been overstated because
courts have traditionally given all matters that increase maximum sentence to jury).
9' 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
9 Id. at 227.
93 Id. at 242.
9 Id. at 242-44.
95 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
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U.S.C. § 2119.96 The statute contained an initial paragraph
describing the basic prohibited conduct and three subsections
providing for three different penalties.97 Subsection (1) provided the
basic penalty of a fine and a maximum prison term of fifteen years.9"
Subsection (2) increased the maximum prison term to twenty-five
years if the crime resulted in "serious bodily injury."9 9 Subsection
(3) increased the maximum prison term to life if death resulted from
the crime. °° Neither the indictment nor the jury instructions in
Jones's trial mentioned the factors in subsections (2) or (3), and
Jones was convicted solely with reference to the elements described
in the initial paragraph of the statute. 10' Based largely on the
presentence report, however, the trial judge found by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that serious bodily injury occurred and imposed
a twenty-five year sentence.0 2
In its previous cases, the Supreme Court had barely looked twice
where a statute defined a basic offense in one section and then
conditioned penalties on other facts in a separate section, as the
caijacking statute did.0 3 In Jones, however, the Court cast a
decidedly skeptical eye on just that sort of statutory scheme.
Emphasizing the dramatic increases in prison time provided in
subsections (2) and (3), the Court stated that "[tihe 'look' of the
statute ... is not a reliable guide to congressional intentions."' 4
The Court seems to have been searching for ambiguity and found it
by disregarding the apparent structure of the statute. Once it
determined that the statute was ambiguous, the Court imposed on
itself a duty to interpret the statute so as to avoid constitutional
difficulties.0 5 Finding that the factors in subsections (2) and (3)
9 Id. at 229.
97 Id. at 230.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 232.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 230-31.
103 Id. After appeal and remand on another issue, the caijacking sentence was reduced
to twenty years. Id. at 232 n.2.
103 See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
104 Jones, 526 U.S. at 233.
'05 Id. at 239.
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were elements rather than sentencing factors, the Court reversed
Jones's sentence.
10 6
The holding in Jones might have been unremarkable, except for
what turned out to be an enormously important footnote. The Court
declared that "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amend-
ment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."107 The
Court immediately qualified that bold statement by noting that its
previous cases "suggest[ed] rather than establish[ed] this
principle,"' and the Court saved itself from facing the issue directly
by holding that the statute should be interpreted to make bodily
injury an element rather than a sentencing factor.0 9 Nevertheless,
a barrier was broken. For the first time, the Court suggested that
the application of the Sixth Amendment jury right, as well as the
Due Process Clause, might turn on considerations beyond the mere
labeling of elements and sentencing factors. "The constitutional
safeguards that figure in our analysis concern not the identity of the
elements defining criminal liability but only the required procedures
for finding the facts that determine the maximum permissible
punishment... .1o Jones stopped short of putting those constitu-
tional safeguards to the test. The Court's next case, however, took
that step.
2. A New Understanding of the Jury's Role at Sentencing.
Apprendi v. New Jersey involved a challenge to a New Jersey hate-
crime statute, under which a defendant's sentence was increased
beyond the normal statutory maximum based upon the trial judge's
finding that the defendant acted "with a purpose to intimidate."
111
Where in Jones the Supreme Court had avoided facing the issue of
whether a matter that a legislature designated a sentencing factor
106 id.
107 Id. at 243 n.6.
108 Id. at 243.
1 Id. at 239.
110 Id. at 243 n.6.
"' 530 U.S. 466, 469-70 (2002).
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could trigger the jury-trial guarantee, in Apprendi, the Court
addressed that issue head-on:
New Jersey threatened Apprendi with certain pains ifhe
unlawfully possessed a weapon and with additional
pains if he selected his victims with a purpose to intimi-
date them because of their race. As a matter of simple
justice, it seems obvious that the procedural safeguards
designed to protect Apprendi from unwarranted pains
should apply equally to the two acts that New Jersey
has singled out for punishment. Merely using the label
"sentence enhancement" to describe the latter surely
does not provide a principled basis for treating them
differently. "2
Instead of focusing on the legislature's intent in designating matters
as elements or sentencing factors, the Court stressed the punish-
ment the defendant faced:
If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by
statute when an offense is committed under certain
circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the
loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are
heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant
should not-at the moment the State is put to proof of
those circumstances-be deprived of protections that
have, until that point, unquestionably attached.
113
On that basis, the Court overturned Apprendi's sentence." 4 This
was the first time the Court declared a statutory sentencing scheme
unconstitutional on Sixth Amendment grounds, and for that reason,
it foreshadowed potentially revolutionary changes to sentencing
112 Id. at 476.
113 Id. at 484.
114 Id. The Court rejected New Jersey's argument that"purpose to intimidate" was merely
an aspect of motive, a traditional sentencing factor. Id. at 493-94. The Court concluded that
because a finding of purpose to intimidate increased the maximum penalty, the factor was
more akin to a second mens rea determination for a separate crime. Id.
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schemes around the country, most prominently to the Guidelines.
But the Court seemed determined to mute Apprendi's revolutionary
potential. The Court limited the scope of its holding so as to avoid
contradicting its decisions in McMillan and Almendarez-Torres.
First, it appeared to leave intact the power of trial judges to make
factual findings affecting punishment, as long as the resulting
penalty was below the maximum authorized by the statute whose
elements were proved at trial."' It also refused to reconsider the
holding of Almendarez-Torres allowing the trial judge to make a
determination of recidivism even where that determination
increased the possible maximum sentence." 6 Having said that, the
Court hinted that it might revisit its decisions in both those cases
if faced with similar situations again."7
Despite its limited holding, Apprendi soon had a practical impact,
most prominently in the area of capital sentencing. In 2002, the
Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, a case addressing Arizona's
capital sentencing scheme."' Under that scheme, first-degree
murder is punishable by either death or life imprisonment."' Death
maybe imposed only if the judge determines at a sentencing hearing
that certain aggravating circumstances are present 2 ° and that those
facts are not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances.'
21
Furthermore, where the underlying charge is felony-murder, as it
was in Ring, the judge could impose the death penalty only if she
found that the accused was a "major participant in the armed
robbery that led to the killing and exhibited a reckless disregard or
"' Id. at 487 n.13 ("We limit [McMillan's] holding to cases that do not involve the
imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established
by the jury's verdict .... [We reserve for another day the question whether stare decisis
considerations preclude reconsideration of [this] holding.").
116 Id. at 488.
117 See id. at 489 ("[Ilt is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided.").
18 536 U.S. 584, 592 (2002).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 593 n. 1. The Court listed ten aggravating circumstances, including whether the
defendant had been previously convicted of other serious offenses, whether the defendant
created a risk of death to persons other than the victim, whether the defendant committed
the offense in return for pecuniary gain, whether the victim was a police officer, and other
factors. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G) (West Supp. 2001)).
121 Id. at 593 n.2. The mitigating circumstances could consist of"any factors proffered by
the defendant or the state which are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence
less than death." Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(H) (West Supp. 2001)).
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indifference for human life."' 22 In its pre-Apprendi decision in
Walton v. Arizona, the Court had held this scheme constitutional in
the face of a Sixth Amendment challenge. 2 '
ApplyingApprendi, the Court in Ring overruled Walton and held
that the jury must determine the existence of the aggravating facts
that make the defendant eligible to receive the death penalty.
12 4
Walton had relied on the traditional distinction between elements
and sentencing factors and found that, because the aggravating
circumstances constituted sentencing factors, the judge could
determine their existence. 125  The Ring Court recognized that
Apprendi had rejected that type of formulaic analysis.'26 It also
rejected the argument that the Arizona scheme fit withinApprendi's
mandate because the statute defining first-degree murder listed
death as the maximum penalty.'27 The Court explained that "[t]his
argument overlooks Apprendi's instruction that 'the relevant inquiry
is one not of form, but of effect.'. . . In effect, 'the required finding
[of an aggravated circumstance exposed Ring] to a greater punish-
ment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict."" 28 Finding
that "the aggravating factors operate as 'the functional equivalent
of an element of a greater offense,' "the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment required the jury to decide those factors.'29
122 Id. at 594. The requirement that these additional factors be present for a felony-
murder defendant to receive the death penalty is constitutionally required by the Eighth
Amendment. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (modifying Enmund by holding
Eighth Amendment permits execution of felony-murder defendant who did not kill or attempt
to kill, but who was "major particip[ant] in the felony committed" and who demonstrated
"reckless indifference to human life"); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (holding
Eighth Amendment requires finding that felony-murder defendant killed or attempted to kill).
23 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990). The majority in Apprendi had argued that Apprendi and
Walton could be reconciled because under the sentencing scheme at issue in Walton, death
was the maximum penalty provided in the first-degree murder statute. Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496 (2000). The Court rejected that argument in Ring, finding that
Apprendi and Walton were irreconcilable. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
124 Ring, 536 U.S. at 589 ("Apprendi's reasoning is irreconcilable with Walton's holding
in this regard, and today we overrule Walton in relevant part.").
121 Walton, 497 U.S. at 648.
126 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
127 Id. at 586.
128 Id. at 604 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)).
129 Id. at 609. In Summerlin v. Stewart, No. 98-99002, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18111, at
*110-*118 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that the rule of Ring applies
retroactively to overturn death penalty sentences imposed unconstitutionally.
2005] 919
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
When Apprendi was decided, many predicted that it would have
dramatic consequences for the Guidelines. 3 ' At first, it appeared
that those predictions would not come true. The lower courts that
initially faced challenges to the Guidelines in the wake of Apprendi
uniformly held that Apprendi does not apply to them 3' because the
Guidelines expressly provide that any sentence imposed thereunder
may not exceed the statutorily authorized maximum sentence.
32
Virtually all the courts assumed that, outside the death penalty
context, a judge could make any determinations as long as the
resulting sentence fell within the statutory maximum. But all of
that changed with the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v.
Washington.1
33
Washington's sentencing scheme, at issue in Blakely, divides
felonies into three classes with legislatively prescribed maximum
sentences for each class. 34 Within each class, a "standard" sentence
range is provided, but the judge has the authority to impose an
"exceptional" sentence above the standard range, but still within the
statutory maximum for the class, if the judge finds certain facts.'35
The defendant, Blakely, pleaded guilty to a Class B felony carrying
a standard sentence range of forty-nine to fifty-three months.
36
Despite the prosecution's recommendation that Blakely receive a
sentence at the high end of that range, the judge imposed a sentence
of ninety months based on his finding that the defendant committed
the crime with "deliberate cruelty." 37 Blakely argued that this
sentence could not be imposed on him consistent with Apprendi.1
38
130 E.g., Erron W. Smith, Apprendi v. New Jersey: The United States Supreme Court
Restricts Judicial Sentencing Discretion and Raises Troubling Constitutional Questions
Concerning Sentencing Statutes and Reforms Nationwide, 54 ARK. L. REV. 649, 650 (2001)
(arguing that Apprendi's bright-line constitutional standard "will result in an inflexible,
unfair, and ultimately unworkable system for sentencing criminal offenders").
131 Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: You Say
You Want a Revolution?, 87 IOWA L. REV. 615, 618 (2002).
132 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(c) (2004).
13' 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
'34 Id. at 2535.
135 Id.
' Id. at 2537.
137 Id.
138 Id.
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The State argued that Apprendi posed no bar to the imposition
of this exceptional sentence because the sentence Blakely received
was still within the legislatively prescribed maximum of ten years
for a Class B felony.'39 The Supreme Court disagreed. Although
Apprendi had expressly addressed judicial determinations leading
to "punishment beyond that provided by statute," the Court in
Blakely concluded that the " 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant," regardless of whether that maximum comes from a
statute or from sentencing guidelines. 4 ° Since the judge's determi-
nation that Blakely committed the crime with "deliberate cruelty"
resulted in a sentence greater than that to which he would have
been subjected solely on the basis of the jury's verdict, the sentence
was unconstitutional.''
Blakely was immediately understood to cast serious constitu-
tional doubt on the Guidelines. Many district courts and circuit
courts of appeal held the Guidelines unconstitutional.'42 The
uncertainty caused by the decision was so great that the Supreme
Court took the unusual step of granting certiorari and expedited
briefing during its summer recess for two of those cases, United
States v. Booker'43 and United States v. Fanfan.' The long-awaited
result in those cases, unfortunately, represents a significant setback
for jury-right advocates.
3. United States v. Booker: The Jury Right in Retreat. In
Booker, the maximum sentence authorized by the jury verdict in the
defendant's drug trial was twenty-one years and ten months. 45 At
sentencing, the trial judge found additional facts, including that the
defendant had possessed an additional 566 grams of crack not
proved at trial, and sentenced the defendant to thirty years in
139 Id.
140 Id. (emphasis in original).
141 Id. at 2538.
142 Ian Weinstein & Nathaniel Z. Marmur, Federal Sentencing During the Interregnum:
Defense Practice as the Blakely Dust Settles, 17 FED. SENTENCING REP. 51, 56 n.4 (2004).
143 125 S. Ct. 738 (2004).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 746.
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prison."' Relying on Blakely, the Seventh Circuit reversed,
concluding that the enhanced sentence violated the Sixth Amend-
ment.14 v In Fanfan, under very similar circumstances, the trial
judge relied on Blakely in declining to increase the defendant's
sentence as called for by the Guidelines, despite finding after a
sentencing hearing that the defendant distributed substantially
more cocaine than the amount found by the jury.148 The Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment in Booker, vacated the judgment in
Fanfan, and remanded both cases. 49
The opinion for the Court addressing whether the Sixth Amend-
ment applies to the Guidelines was written by Justice Stevens.
Stevens began by reaffirming the holding in Blakely that the Sixth
Amendment is implicated "whenever a judge seeks to impose a
sentence that is not solely based on 'facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant.'" 5 o He then devoted much of
his opinion to responding to the argument that the Guidelines are
immune from challenge because they do not allow sentences to
exceed statutorily prescribed maxima.' 51  Without analysis, he
implicitly accepted the contention that judges may find facts in
exercising their discretion to set a sentence within a statutory
range:
If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as
merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather
than required, the selection of particular sentences in
response to differing sets of facts, their use would not
implicate the Sixth Amendment. We have never
doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad
discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory
range. 152
146 Id.
147 Id. at 746-47.
148 Id. at 747.
149 Id. at 769.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 750-52.
152 Id. at 750.
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But he concluded that because the Guidelines are mandatory, they
function as laws; that is, they are the equivalent of statutes. 53 So,
if the Guidelines call for a particular sentence range based on the
findings made by the jury, the judge may not make additional
findings that result in an increase in the sentence range.'" To do so
would be the equivalent of setting the sentence outside a statutory
range. 5
5
Stevens's preferred remedy, explained in his separate dissent,
was to leave the Guidelines intact but require that they conform to
the Sixth Amendment requirements spelled out in Apprendi,
Blakely, and the other cases. 5 ' Under Stevens's remedy, a judge
would use the Guidelines to determine a sentencing range based on
the jury's findings or on the offense to which the defendant pleaded.
The judge could then also rely on the Guidelines and make any
findings of fact called for in setting a particular sentence within that
range.5 7 But the judge could not set the sentence outside that range
based on additional fact-finding, unless either the jury found those
facts or the defendant waived the right to have a jury decide those
facts.158
Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, did not agree that judicial decisionmaking
under the Guidelines implicates the Sixth Amendment.'59 Prefer-
ring to retain the formal elements-sentencing facts distinction, that
group had dissented in Apprendi and Blakely.' In Booker, Breyer
argued on behalf of the dissenters that Blakely did not compel the
application of the Sixth Amendment at sentencing even if Blakely
were valid.'61 Breyer's primary argument was that the Guidelines
are not statutes but merely "administratively written sentencing
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
'56 Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1,1 Id. at 780.
' 8 Id. at 779.
'59 Id. at 802 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
'6 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at
2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 523 (2000) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16' Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 805-07 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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rules" that operate to guide and cabin judicial discretion to set
sentences within statutorily prescribed ranges.'62 He would have
preferred to leave the Guidelines intact and operative as written. 16 3
Faced with the majority's conclusion that the Guidelines implicate
the Sixth Amendment, however, Breyer devised a remedy that
leaves them intact for most practical purposes, but with greater
judicial discretion to depart from them.164
Breyer's remedy rests on the implicit assumption made by
Stevens that the constitutional infirmity resulted because the
Guidelines are mandatory. Stevens was attempting to fit his
conclusion about the unconstitutionality of the Guidelines into the
framework the Court had established from Apprendi through
Blakely. That framework focused on judicial fact-finding that
pushes a sentence beyond a statutory maximum.16  To fit the
holding within that framework, Stevens had to find that the
Guidelines had the effect of statutes. To do that, he relied on the
fact that application of the Guidelines was mandatory. 6 And the
corollary to that conclusion is that, were the Guidelines merely
advisory, they would not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment. Breyer
seized on that line of reasoning to conclude that an equal and
alternative remedy to requiring increased jury fact-finding would be
to make judicial fact-finding discretionary.' 7 The apparent
rationale, which Breyer never explained, is that any exercise of
judicial discretion at sentencing-no matter what it consists of-is
constitutional as long as it operates within statutorily prescribed
ranges. Concluding that Congress would have preferred this
remedy either to Stevens's remedy or to the total invalidation of the
Guidelines, Breyer and his majority held that the Guidelines should
be left intact, but made advisory rather than mandatory. 6 1
162 Id.
163 Id. at 803.
164 Id. at 757.
'" See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
'1 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750.
167 Id. at 756-57.
'68 Id. at 758-59.
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To implement this remedy, the Breyer majority severed and
excised two statutory provisions. First, in order to make the
Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory, the Court excised the
provision that requires courts to impose a sentence within the
applicable Guidelines range. 169 Then, to ensure that trial judges
genuinely have discretion in sentencing under the Guidelines, the
Court excised the provision providing for de novo appellate review
of departures from the applicable Guidelines range.' Other
provisions, such as those requiring judges to consider the applicable
Guidelines sentencing range, Sentencing Commission policy
statements, the need to avoid sentencing disparities, the seriousness
of the offense, and the need for just punishment and adequate
deterrence, remain operative.' 7 ' So a judge inclined to follow the
letter of the Guidelines is entirely within his rights to do so. For a
defendant being sentenced by such a judge, absolutely nothing has
changed.
Putting Stevens's majority opinion together with Breyer's
majority opinion yields the following constitutional principle: The
Sixth Amendment bars a judge from imposing a sentence not solely
based on the facts reflected in the jury's verdict or admitted by the
defendant; except that the judge may impose a sentence greater
than that countenanced by the jury's verdict or the defendant's
admissions as long as he does so pursuant to his own discretion.
Where the right to a jury trial used to extend exactly as far as
Congress chose to allow it, today, the right to a jury trial extends
exactly as far as any individual judge chooses to allow it.
As a matter of logic, this principle makes no sense. It simulta-
neously confers and negates the right to a jury decision on sentenc-
ing facts. Jurisprudentially, it seems difficult to justify in light of
the strong wording of Apprendi and Blakely. A more logically
consistent holding would have been to conclude simply that the
Guidelines do not implicate the Sixth Amendment because they
operate exclusively within statutory minima and maxima. But that
... Id. at 764; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000) (mandating that courts impose sentences
within applicable statutory ranges).
170 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764; see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000) (providing for appellate review
of sentencing decisions).
' Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764-65.
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holding would have had the same practical weakness as the one the
Court in fact handed down: Both approaches exacerbate the
disparity between the scope of the criminal jury right under the
Sixth Amendment and the scope of the civil jury right under the
Seventh Amendment. As I show in Part III, the Court has been
much more assiduous in protecting the right to a jury decision on
important questions of fact in the civil context than in the criminal
context.
III. QUESTIONS OF FACT UNDER THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
While the scope of the criminal jury right has fluctuated over the
years with changes in the philosophy of punishment, the scope of
the civil jury right has remained fairly consistent. That is largely
because the Seventh Amendment commands that "[iun Suits at
common law,.., the right of trial by jury shall be preserved," '172 and
courts have interpreted that to mean the right should be preserved
in approximately the same condition it was in at the founding.
Consistent with understandings of the scope of the jury right at that
time, courts have ensured that civil juries have primary authority
to decide questions of fact, whether those questions arise in the
liability stage or in the remedy stage of litigation. In cases in which
a civil jury has been properly demanded, therefore, civil litigants
can expect ajury to decide virtually all questions going to the merits
that require inferences about the historical events in dispute.
A. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIMACY OF FACT QUESTIONS
Although the Seventh Amendment does not expressly grant juries
the responsibility for deciding questions of fact, it suggests that
finding facts is the jury's primary role in its second clause, the "Re-
examination Clause,"'73 which provides that "no fact tried by a jury
172 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
173 The Re-examination Clause was motivated by the fear that the federal appellate
jurisdiction provided in Article III of the Constitution would allow creditors to overturn local
jury verdicts favorable to debtors. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 673-74 (1973)
One cannot read through Jonathan Elliot's collection of debates in the
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shall be otherwise re-examined ... than according to the rules of the
common law."174 The Judiciary Act enacted by the first Congress
used the same terminology in its assignment of decisional responsi-
bility by providing that "the trial of issues of fact, in the district
courts, in all causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, shall be by jury."175
In keeping with these constitutional and statutory commands,
the Supreme Court has traditionally relied on the fact-law distinc-
tion to define the roles of judge and jury in civil litigation. In
Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific Railroad Co., for example,
the Court concluded that the aim of the Seventh Amendment
is not to preserve mere matters of form and procedure
but substance of right. This requires that questions of
fact in common law actions shall be settled by a jury, and
that the court shall not assume directly or indirectly to
take from the jury or to itself such prerogative. 176
Similarly, in Ex parte Peterson, the Court approved tentative fact-
finding by an auditor but stated that "[t]he limitation imposed by
the amendment is merely that enjoyment of the right of trial by jury
be not obstructed, and that the ultimate determination of issues of
fact by the jury be not interfered with." 77 And in Byrd v. Blue Ridge
state ratification conventions without being struck by the repeated
connection made by antifederalist speakers ... between the right ofjury
trial in civil cases and the plight of debtors who would be required to
defend debt actions in the new federal courts ....
Id.
174 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
... Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (emphasis added). Provisions
in the current Judiciary Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also reference the
fact-law distinction in defining aspects of the modern civil jury right. Although the Judicial
Code no longer contains a provision expressly assigning questions of fact to the jury, it does
provide that in the unusual case of an original action in the Supreme Court against a citizen
of the United States, "issues of fact shall be tried by a jury." 28 U.S.C. § 1872 (2000) ("In all
original actions at law in the Supreme Court against citizens of the United States, issues of
fact shall be tried by a jury."). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, the basic rule providing for
jury trial in federal district courts, provides that where one party demands a jury trial on only
some issues, the other party may demand a jury trial on "all of the issues of fact in the
action." FED. R. Civ. P. 38(c).
16 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (emphasis added).
177 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920) (emphasis added).
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Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., the Court declared that "[a]n
essential characteristic of [the federal] system is the manner in
which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions
between judge and jury and, under the influence-if not the
command---of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of
disputed questions of fact to the jury."7 '
These decisions came without any cogent analysis of how to
distinguish a question of fact from a question of law. The Court
seems to have simply assumed that fact questions are intuitively
recognizable and left it to judges to intuit the correct results. Over
the last century, sophisticated legal thinkers have seized on courts'
failure to enunciate standards for distinguishing questions of fact
from questions of law to challenge both the validity of the fact-law
distinction in general and its usefulness in guiding the allocation of
decisional responsibility in particular.'79 These scholars have
argued that courts invoke the fact-law distinction in order to
camouflage their normative conclusions that a question should go to
the judge or to the jury.'
178 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) (emphasis added); see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,
486 (1935) ("The controlling distinction between the power of the court and that of the jury
is that the former is the power to determine the law and the latter to determine the facts.");
Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) ("All of vital significance
in trial by jury is that issues of fact be submitted for determination. .. ").
179 See, e.g., JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAw 185 (1898) ("[T]here is not, and never was, any such thing injury trials as an
allotment of all questions of fact to the jury."); Nathan Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1922) ("The delusive simplicity of the distinction between questions of
law and questions of fact has been found a will-of-the-wisp by travellers approaching it from
several directions."); Clarence Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1942)
("The naive assumption that law and fact stand naturally apart draws attention away from
the role that law plays in the selection and description of facts, and that facts play in
impelling the adoption of rules and in limiting the scope of their application.").
180 See LON. L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAw 593 (6th ed.
1996)
It is commonly said that questions of fact are for the jury and questions
of law are for the judge. A more realistic analysis would be that questions
the legal system assigns to the jury are called 'questions of fact,' and
questions the legal system assigns to the judge are called 'questions of
law.'
Id.; 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5052, at 249 (1977) ("[Jludges decide many questions of fact, just
as the jury can decide many questions of law, and therefore the law-fact dichotomy is a poor
basis for allocating functions between them."); Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth
of the Fact-Law Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (2003)
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In a series of recent cases applying the Seventh Amendment, the
Supreme Court has adopted this skepticism about the fact-law
distinction and proposed alternative considerations to govern the
selection of a decisionmaker. The most important of the Court's
recent cases in this regard is Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc. 181 Markman raised the issue of whether the Seventh Amend-
ment requires a jury decision on the construction of the claims in a
patent.'82 On this issue, the Court seemed to break with prior
practice. Although earlier decisions had described the function of
the Seventh Amendment as "preserving the substance of the
common-law right" to a jury, they had linked the "substance of the
right" to the determination of facts.'83 But in Markman, the Court
ostensibly divorced the "substance of the right" from the question of
fact determination. After an inconclusive historical and
precedential analysis, the Court turned its attention to "functional
considerations," finding that
when an issue "falls somewhere between a pristine legal
standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law
distinction at times has turned on a determination that,
as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one
judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide
the issue in question."184
[T]he quest to find "the" essential difference between the [law and fact]
that can control subsequent classifications of questions as legal or factual
is doomed from the start, as there is no essential difference. There are
only pragmatic differences, which are reflected in the three dichotomies
of the conventional meaning of the terms, the judge-jury relationship, and
the general-specific spectrum.
Id.
d'1 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
182 Id. at 372.
" Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Chaplin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) ("[Tlhe Constitution
is concerned, not with form, but with substance. All of vital significance in trial by jury is
that issues of fact be submitted for determination [by the jury]."); Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac.
R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (holding that purpose of Seventh Amendment "is not to
preserve mere matters of form and procedure but substance of right" and that " It]his requires
that questions of fact in common law actions shall be settled by a jury").
184 Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
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Citing the "highly technical" nature of patents and noting that "[t]he
construction of written instruments is one of those things that
judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened
by training in exegesis," the Court found that "judges, not juries, are
the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms."18 5
Based on that conclusion, the Court held that the judge may
permissibly construe the claims in a patent.
8 6
The Court relied on Markman in City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes, Ltd., in which the Court faced due process, equal protection,
and takings challenges to a municipality's refusal to grant develop-
ment applications.8 7 The district court had granted Del Monte
Dunes's request for a jury trial on the takings and equal protection
claims but denied it on the substantive due process claim, reserving
that claim for the court's determination. 8 The central issue on
appeal was whether the takings claim was properly submitted to the
jury."" The Court's analysis of this issue mirrored that in
Markman. As in Markman, the Court purported to rely on
"functional considerations." 9 ° The functional analysis, however,
focused almost exclusively on the fact-law distinction. The Court
began by noting that "[iun actions at law predominantly factual
issues are in most cases allocated to the jury." 9 ' The Court then
cited its takings precedents for the proposition that "determinations
of liability in regulatory takings cases [are] essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries,... requiring complex factual assessments of the
purposes and economic effects of government actions."'92 It
concluded that "the issue of whether a landowner has been deprived
of all economically viable use of his property is a predominantly
factual question." 193 The Court found the question of whether the
" Id. The Court also concluded that the importance of uniformity in treatment of a
patent was reason to assign claim construction to a judge, whose decision becomes precedent
available in future cases involving the same product. Id. at 390.
'8 Id. at 391.
18 526 U.S. 687, 698 (1999).
18 Id. at 699.
18 Id. at 701. The jury returned a general verdict for Del Monte Dunes on the takings
claim and awarded $1.45 million in compensatory damages. Id.
190 Id. at 718.
19' Id. at 720.
192 Id. (citations omitted).
193 Id.
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regulation substantially advances legitimate public interests to be
a mixed question of law and fact. 194 But the Court concluded that
the question was so "essentially fact-bound [in] nature" that it
required a jury decision.1 95
Taken together, Markman and Del Monte Dunes ostensibly move
the analysis of the civil jury right away from the fact-law distinc-
tion. By introducing "functional" considerations into the analysis of
decisional responsibility, Markman suggested that courts should
pragmatically evaluate the skills of judge and jury to determine
which is best suited to decide a particular issue. Del Monte Dunes
at least payed lip service to that admonition. Still, both decisions
explicitly refer to the traditional role of the civil jury as a paramount
concern, and it is impossible to divorce the jury's traditional role
from the finding of fact. Indeed, although it purports to rely on
Markman's "functional considerations,"Del Monte Dunes reempha-
sizes the fact-law distinction as a basis, or at least as ajustification,
for assigning a particular decision to the jury instead of to the
judge.9 6 It suggests that the jury's proper function is to decide
issues of fact, so that Markman's "new" analysis is nothing more
than a new way of talking about the fact-law distinction.
In two other recent cases, the Court addressed the scope of the
Seventh Amendment jury right in the remedies context.' 97 Perhaps
echoing the trends in criminal cases, these cases betray an underly-
ing ambivalence about the jury's role in determining remedies.
Unlike its jurisprudence interpreting the Sixth Amendment jury
right, however, the Court's decisions in this context seem finally to
have embraced the view that the jury should decide questions of fact
in both nodes of the civil trial.
The first case, Tull v. United States, involved a suit by the federal
government seeking an injunction and civil penalties against Tull,
a real estate developer, for dumping fill on wetlands in violation of
19 Id. at 721.
195 Id.
196 id.
197 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340,342 (1998); Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 414 (1987).
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the Clean Water Act.' 98 The Act provided for "a civil penalty not to
exceed $25,000 per day" during the period of any violation. 199 The
district court denied Tull's demand for a jury trial and then, after
finding that Tull had illegally filled in wetland areas, imposed
$325,000 in civil penalties. 00 The Supreme Court affirmed the
imposition of the civil penalty by the trial judge.2 ' The Court found
that the Seventh Amendment operates to preserve "[olnly those
incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of
the essence of the system of trial by jury."20 2 The Court concluded
that, because Congress has the power to fix civil penalties statuto-
rily, the assessment of civil penalties is not a fundamental element
of a jury trial.20 3  Therefore, the Court reasoned, Congress may
appropriately delegate that responsibility to judges.20 4
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. raised the question
of whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury decision on
statutory damages to be awarded for violation of the Copyright
Act.205 The Supreme Court held that it does. After finding that
suits for statutory damages under the Copyright Act were
essentially "legal," so that the Seventh Amendment applied,20 6 the
Court held that the specific question of the amount of statutory
damages had to go to the jury, based on the traditional preference
for jury determinations of damages and on the fact that, under the
Copyright Act of 1831, juries had determined statutory damages.0 v
The Court distinguished Tull, noting that there had been no
198 Tull, 481 U.S. at 414; see 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (regulating discharge of fill material
into navigable waters and adjacent wetlands).
199 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2000); Tul, 481 U.S. at 414.
200 Tull, 481 U.S. at 415-16. The court also entered an injunction ordering the removal
of fill and restoration of the properties still owned by Tull. Id.
201 Id. at 427.
f Id. at 426.
M3 Id.
"' Id. at 426-27. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented. Id. at 427. He
pointed out that, while Congress could choose to create a statutory cause of action with a fixed
recovery, it did not do so in this case. Id. at 427-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Instead, Congress
provided for a recovery very similar to a punitive damage award, to be assessed on a case-by-
case basis. Id. Scalia argued that, just as punitive damages are typically assessed by the
jury, this civil penalty should be assessed by the jury. Id.
2m0 523 U.S. 340, 342-43 (1998).
206 Id. at 351-52.
20 Id. at 350-55.
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evidence in Tull that juries historically determined the amount of
civil penalties paid to the government and that civil penalties are
analogous to sentencing in a criminal proceeding. °8
The Court in Feltner gave almost no justification for its decision
beyond its bare historical analysis. Although the Court did not
discuss it, the determination of the damages under the Copyright
Act depended on a decision that the violations were committed
"willfully."0 9 Columbia put in evidence of willfulness, and the lower
court found that Feltner had acted willfully.210 The assessment of
the defendant's mental state has always been considered a matter
of fact, so in practical effect, the decision reinforces jury control over
the findings of fact.
Moreover, the majority opinion was authored by Justice Thomas,
who has emerged as a prominent advocate for an expanded jury
right in criminal cases.2 ' Thomas hinted that Tull might have been
wrongly decided:
It should be noted that Tull is at least in tension with
Bank of Hamilton v. Lessee of Dudley, in which the
Court held in light of the Seventh Amendment that a
jury must determine the amount of compensation for
improvements to real estate, and withDimick v. Schiedt,
in which the Court held that the Seventh Amendment
bars the use of additur.212
Thus, the Court may have been using Feltner to correct a wrong
turn taken in Tull. Certainly, Feltner suggests that most damages
issues in civil cases should remain the province of the jury.
208 Id. at 355.
209 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000) (stating that if infringement is committed willfully,
court "may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000,"
whereas if it is found that "infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe his or her
acts constituted infringement," then it is within court's discretion to reduce damages "to a
sum of not less than $200").
210 Feltner, 523 U.S. at 344.
211 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 521-22 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that Sixth Amendment applies not only to facts increasing maximum penalty, but
also to facts increasing mandatory minimum penalty).
212 Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355 n.9 (citations omitted).
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And while Tull suggests that the determination of the amount of
a civil penalty might be removed from the jury, Feltner suggests that
remedies issues should normally be left to the jury, at least where
they involve factual determinations such as whether the defendant
acted willfully. In short, despite its discomfort, the Court continues
to affirm that the jury's primary role in civil cases is to decide
questions of fact, and it has never allowed a court to take from the
jury a question that has traditionally been understood to involve
factual determinations.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DIVERGENT
JURY-RIGHT JURISPRUDENCE
With respect to jury-right issues such as the characteristics and
selection of the jury, the Supreme Court has treated civil and
criminal juries similarly. As explained in Parts II and III of this
Article, however, with respect to the assignment of decisionmaking
responsibility, the Court has treated civil jury rights and criminal
jury rights as entirely distinct. As a consequence, an anomalous and
unjustifiable divergence between the types of issues civil and
criminal litigants can expect to have a jury decide has emerged. A
comparison of the methods for determining civil punitive awards
and criminal sentences shows why this is so. A focus on the reasons
for why we value the jury shows why the divergence is unjustifiable.
A. COMPARING THE JURY RIGHTS: CIVIL PUNITIVE AWARDS VERSUS
CRIMINAL SENTENCES
In civil cases, punitive damages are awarded to punish a
defendant who has committed a willful wrong. The Supreme Court
has expressly called punitive damages "quasi-criminal" and equated
states' power to authorize punitive damage awards with their power
to sentence in criminal cases.213 Just as for many years courts
23 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001)
As in the criminal sentencing context, legislatures enjoy broad discretion
in authorizing and limiting permissible punitive damages awards....
Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to the
imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process
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assumed that juries had near total power over the punishment a
criminal defendant would face, for many years courts simply
assumed that the award of punitive damages was an issue to be
decided by the jury. In its 1886 decision in Barry v. Edmunds, for
example, the Supreme Court declared that "[niothing is better
settled than that . . . it is the peculiar function of the jury to
determine the amount [of punitive damages] by their verdict."214
More recently, several circuit courts have expressly declared that
the Seventh Amendment protects the right to a jury decision on the
amount of punitive damages.215
In recent years, however, as the Court has taken up the perceived
excessiveness of punitive damages, it has begun to restrain the
jury's power to award punitive damages. In the landmark case
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court held that a jury's
punitive award may violate due process if it is "grossly excessive."216
To ensure that punitive awards do not fail that test, judges must
now scrutinize punitive awards to a degree they had not in the past.
Borrowing from its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court in
Gore directed trial judges to examine awards for excessiveness using
three "guideposts": "the degree of reprehensibility of the
nondisclosure, the disparity between the harm or potential harm
suffered by [the plaintiffl and his punitive damages award, and the
difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases."217
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., the
Court considered the appropriate standard of review an appellate
court should use in reviewing the trial judge's excessiveness
determination.21 The Court concluded that appellate courts should
review that determination de novo because the underlying punitive
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution imposes
substantive limits on that discretion.
Id.
214 116 U.S. 550, 556 (1886).
21' Defender Indus., Inc. v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins., 938 F.2d 502,507 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc);
O'Gilvie v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1447-48 (10th Cir. 1987); McKinnon v. City of
Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1391-92 (7th Cir. 1984).
216 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).
217 Id. at 575; see also Cooper, 532 U.S. at 435 (citing Eighth Amendment cases).
218 532 U.S. at 432-36.
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award reviewed by the trial judge constitutes a question of law
rather than one of fact.219 "Unlike the measure of actual damages
suffered, which presents a question of historical or predictive
fact,.., the level of punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by
the jury."220 The Court concluded further that, because the amount
of punitive damages awarded is not a fact question, it does not
implicate the Seventh Amendment's Re-examination Clause.22'
"Because the jury's award of punitive damages does not constitute
a finding of 'fact,' appellate review of the District Court's determina-
tion that an award is consistent with due process does not implicate
the Seventh Amendment concerns raised by respondent and its
amicus."222
Gore and Cooper call into question the long-standing assumption
that it is the jury's prerogative to determine the amount of punitive
damages to be awarded. To that extent, these cases seem to move
the civil jury right closer to the Court's current interpretation of the
criminal jury right, in that the Court seems to believe that judges
are the appropriate actors to impose punishment, whether the
punishment is considered civil or criminal.223 But there is an
important caveat in Cooper that reaffirms the traditional view that
juries should make all relevant findings of fact that underlie the
award, even if a judge has ultimate power to set an amount of
punishment.224
219 Id. at 424.
220 Id. at 437 (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 459 (1996)).
22' Id. at 437-39.
222 Id.
20 Id. at 437; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996); see also Tull v.
United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426-27 (1987) (holding that Seventh Amendment does not
require jury decision on amount of statutory civil penalties under Clean Water Act).
22 This is, in fact, a distinction the Court had already drawn in addressing the standard
of review to be used in Eighth Amendment excessive punishment cases. Cooper, 532 U.S. at
435 (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-37 n.10 (1998))
The factual findings made by the district courts in conducting the
excessiveness inquiry, of course, must be accepted unless clearly
erroneous . . . . But the question whether a fine is constitutionally
excessive calls for the application of a constitutional standard to the facts
of a particular case, and in this context de novo review of that question is
appropriate.
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The factors that go into determining the amount of punitive
damages that should be awarded differ from state to state and court
to court, but they typically include consideration of the character of
the defendant's conduct, the defendant's motive, and the amount of
money required to deter the defendant and others from engaging in
similar conduct in the future.225 For example, in TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., a recent case in which the Court
upheld a punitive award against a due process challenge, the jury
had been instructed by the trial court to consider "all of the
circumstances surrounding the particular occurrence, including the
nature of the wrongdoing, the extent of the harm inflicted, the
intent of the party committing the act, the wealth of the perpetrator,
as well as any mitigating circumstances which may operate to
reduce the amount of the damages ."226 And the jury in Cooper was
instructed to consider the following factors: "(1) 'The character of
the defendant's conduct that is the subject of Leatherman's unfair
competition claims'; (2) 'The defendant's motive'; (3) 'The sum of
money that would be required to discourage the defendant and
others from engaging in such conduct in the future'; and (4) 'The
defendant's income and assets.' ,227
The Supreme Court in Cooper expressly distinguished between
the jury's factual findings on those matters and the determination
22- Id. at 440 n. 12 (quoting jury instructions).
226 509 U.S. 443,464 n.29 (1993); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-
22 (1991) (affirming very large punitive damages award over due process objection). In
Haslip, the Supreme Court cited as providing adequate procedural protections the following
factors that the Alabama courts took into account in assessing the fairness of punitive
awards:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive
damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct
as well as the harm that actually has occurred; (b) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct,
the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and
frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the defendant of
the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of
having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the 'financial position' of the
defendant; (e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal
sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitigation;
and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the
same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.
499 U.S. at 21-22.
227 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 440 n.12.
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of the amount of the award, indicating that the right to a jury
decision covers the former: "Although the jury's application of these
instructions may have depended on specific findings of fact, nothing
in our decision today suggests that the Seventh Amendment would
permit a court, in reviewing a punitive damages award, to disregard
such jury findings."228 Justice Ginsburg, writing in dissent, listed
some of the "fact questions" that would fall within the jury's
purview: "the extent of harm or potential harm caused by the
defendant's misconduct, whether the defendant acted in good faith,
whether the misconduct was an individual instance or part of a
broader pattern, whether the defendant behaved negligently,
recklessly, or maliciously."229
The Court in Cooper thus segregated out a category of "fact
questions" consisting of questions about the historical events in
dispute-what the defendant did and the circumstances surround-
ing it, what the defendant was thinking, and what the consequences
of the defendant's actions were-and suggested that those questions
are reserved for the jury. A court is not free to supplant the jury's
judgment on those questions with its own. On the other hand, the
Court concluded that other sorts of questions that go into the
punitive damages calculus, such as questions about the moral
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and about the sanctions
imposed for comparable conduct in other contexts, fall outside the
jury's bailiwick.23 °
Compare that decisionmaking structure with the structure for
imposing sentences in criminal cases under the Court's current
Id. The Court had earlier suggested such a distinction in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Television, Inc., in which, distinguishing Tull v. United States, the Court held that the
Seventh Amendment required a jury decision on statutory damages to be awarded under the
Copyright Act. 523 U.S. 340, 341 (1998). The Court emphasized the importance of the
determination of willfulness--clearly a factual issue-with respect to the damages
calculation. Id.
22 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
m Id. at 424, 437-40. The Court has drawn similar distinctions with respect to other
issues. For example, in discussing whether a lower court could disregard the plaintiffs claim
for exemplary damages in determining the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes,
the Court said: "In no case is it permissible for the court to substitute itself for the jury, and
compel a compliance on the part of the latter with its own view of the facts in evidence, as the
standard and measure of that justice, which the jury itself is the appointed constitutional
tribunal to award." Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886).
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Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. The Guidelines contain numerous
provisions that tie the sentence to be imposed to exactly the sorts of
factual determinations that the Court said the jury must decide in
a civil case involving punitive damages. On the issue of the "extent
of harm" caused by the defendant's conduct, for example, the
Guidelines increase the sentence for aggravated assault based on
the degree of bodily injury suffered by the victim.23' On the issue of
whether the conduct was isolated or part of a broader pattern, the
Guidelines increase the sentence for fraud based on whether the
offense involved "sophisticated means" or a scheme to defraud a
large number of victims.232 And on the issue of whether the
defendant acted in good faith or maliciously, the Guidelines
decrease the sentence for criminal infringement of copyright where
the offense "was not committed for commercial advantage or private
financial gain." "'
Under Booker, trial judges must still "consider" the Guidelines
and may not depart from them in ways that would produce "unrea-
sonable" sentences." 4 Undoubtedly, many judges will continue to
apply the Guidelines just as they always have, making those
determinations on a preponderance of the evidence standard, in a
posttrial proceeding in which the rules of evidence do not apply.23
The Sixth Amendment offers no bar. Indeed, following the Guide-
lines appears to be a safe harbor; Booker implies that judges will
only need to demonstrate the reasonableness of any sentence not
reached according to the Guidelines' methodology.
2 36
23' U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.2(b)(3) (2004); cf id. § 2Bl.I(b) (providing
for increase in offense level for larceny, embezzlement, or theft based on amount of loss).
232 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A), (8); cf id. § 2A3.1(b)(3), (b)(5) (providing for increase in offense
level for criminal sexual abuse based on whether victim was in custody or care of defendant
or was abducted); id. § 2B1.l(b)(5) (providing for increase in offense level for property crimes
based on whether offense involved misappropriation of trade secret and defendant knew or
intended that offense would benefit foreign instrumentality).
Id. § 2B5.3(b)(3); see also id. § 2A2.2(b)(4) (providing for increase in offense level for
aggravated assault where "assault was motivated by a payment or offer of money or other
thing of value"); id. § 2C1.1(c)(1) (providing for increase in offense level for bribery where
"offense was committed for the purpose of facilitating the commission of another criminal
offense").
. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 764-65 (2004).
2 See infra notes 312-16 and accompanying text (explaining standards for fact-finding
under Guidelines).
23 See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 767 (discussing "unreasonableness" standard of appellate
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To see how the disparity between the civil and criminal jury
rights plays out in practice, consider the Supreme Court's recent
punitive damages case TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resource
Corp.237 TXO was a civil action in which punitive damages were
awarded against TXO in connection with a counterclaim by Alliance
for "slander of title."23 The counterclaim asserted that TXO had
falsely claimed that there was a cloud on the title of property owned
by Alliance, in an effort to force Alliance to negotiate favorable
royalty terms with TXO.2 39 Thus, the case was effectively based on
an intentional misrepresentation, or fraud. In determining punitive
damages, the jury was instructed to consider "all of the circum-
stances surrounding the particular occurrence, including the nature
of the wrongdoing, the extent of the harm inflicted, the intent of the
party committing the act, the wealth of the perpetrator, as well as
any mitigating circumstances which may operate to reduce the
amount of the damages."24 ° Under the rationale of Cooper, the
Court could not have taken the determination of those factual
questions away from the jury.
If TXO had faced criminal prosecution instead, many of the same
factors would have been considered, but the judge could have made
the determinations free of any jury input. TXO's "crime" would fall
under section 2B of the Guidelines, which addresses "offenses
involving fraud or deceit."24' A judge following that section would
have determined the "offense level," and hence the severity of the
sentence to be imposed, by considering a wide range of "specific
offense characteristics."242 The judge would have determined the
"loss" suffered by the victim or victims in dollars, in increments from
$5,000 to $400,000,000.243 She would have determined how many
review of sentencing decisions).
237 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
238 Id. at 447.
239 Id. at 450.
240 Id. at 464 n.29; see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991)
(listing allowable considerations). In Haslip, the Supreme Court affirmed a very large
punitive damages award over a due process objection, implicitly relying on the Jury's
determination of a number of factual matters very similar to those considered in TXO. See
supra note 226 (citing Haslip factors).
24 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 2B1 (2004).
2 Id. § 2B.A(b).
m Id. § 2BI.I(b)(1)(A)-(N).
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victims were affected, increasing the sentence if the number of
victims equaled or exceeded ten and again if the number equaled or
exceeded fifty.2" And she would have considered evidence about the
methodology the defendant used to determine whether the offense
involved "sophisticated means."245
Assume that this hypothetical criminal case against TXO
involved the prosecution of an individual defendant for fraud. The
jury in TXO found that Alliance had suffered actual damages of
$19,000 from defending the frivolous lawsuit.246 But the evidence
suggested that TXO had hoped to see a windfall of millions of
dollars if its fraudulent scheme had succeeded.247 A hypothetical
TXO defendant convicted of criminal fraud would not have had a
right to a jury determination on either of those amounts. Instead,
a judge could have determined the "loss," which is defined as the
greater of actual or intended loss.2' s All other things being equal, a
judicial determination that the fraud produced a loss of $19,000
would have doubled the sentence range the defendant would
face-from zero to six months to six to twelve months.24 9 But if the
judge had determined that the intended loss was, say, $1,000,001-a
modest figure given the evidence 25 -the TXO defendant's sentence
range would jump to three to four years.25' Other factual determi-
nations could increase the sentence further.
In sum, because of the Supreme Court's cramped interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment, judges implementing most modern
244 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2).
245 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C).
2 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 451 (1993).
247 See id. at 460-61 ("[Tlhe [court] concluded that TXO's pattern of behavior 'could
potentially cause millions of dollars in damage to other victims.' ").
24 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3 (2004) (defining "actual
loss" and "intended loss").
?49 Id. §§ 2BI.1(b)(1)(C) & ch. 5, pt. A.
no The apparent goal of TXO's fraudulent scheme was to renegotiate its royalty
agreement with Alliance, which gave Alliance 22% of royalties from oil and gas wells drilled
on the subject property. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 875 (W. Va.
1992). The evidence suggested that the value of the income stream from the wells would be
between $22.5 million and $37.5 million. TXO, 509 U.S. at 451 n.10. A reduction of even a
few percentage points would have resulted in a windfall to TXO of more than a million
dollars. Id.
21 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I) & ch. 5, pt. A (2004).
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determinate sentencing schemes 252 -most importantly the
Guidelines-make many determinations at sentencing that
unequivocally involve the finding of facts. These determinations
include such clearly factual determinations as the amount of money
embezzled,253 whether an assault was motivated by pecuniary
gain,2 4 and whether the victim of sexual abuse was in the custody
of the abuser.255 In a civil case, in contrast, where issues such as
those are relevant to either the liability or the damages calculation,
the jury would decide them.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF JURY FACT-FINDING
The disparity in the issues civil and criminal litigants can expect
to have the jury decide, so vividly demonstrated in the punitive
damages context, runs contrary to our fundamental notions about
the right to a jury trial. The right to a jury trial in criminal cases
has always been valued more highly than the right to a jury trial in
civil cases. That principle is evident in the Constitution, which
expressly guarantees the right in criminal cases in Article III but
leaves the civil jury right to the Bill of Rights.256 In keeping with
that hierarchy, criminal juries have the power, if technically not the
right, to decide cases contrary to the governing law. Civil juries
have no such power. Yet in the allocation of decisionmaking
between judge and jury, the hierarchy is turned on its head, with
the civil jury having broader authority than the criminal jury.
Simple logical consistency would suggest this disparity should be
removed. For constitutional rights to remain vital, they need to
make sense to the citizens subject to them. While empirical data on
this point would be hard to find, it seems almost self-evident that a
typical citizen would assume that the scope of the criminal jury
" For an overview of determinate sentencing schemes, see CASSIA C. SPOHN, How Do
JUDGES DECIDE? THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE IN PUNISHMENT 223-31 (2002).
"m See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b) (2004) (providing for increase
in offense level for larceny, embezzlement, or theft based on amount of loss).
254 See id. § 2A2.2(b)(4) (providing for increase in offense level for aggravated assault
where "assault was motivated by a payment or offer of money or other thing of value").
' See id. § 2A3.1(b) (providing for increase in offense level for criminal sexual abuse
based on whether victim was in custody or care of defendant or was abducted).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 & amend. VII.
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right matches or exceeds the scope of the civil jury right. Reality
should match that expectation. But beyond a reliance on logical
consistency, compelling normative reasons exist for giving fact
questions to the jury, whether those questions appear in the liability
or the penalty phase of adjudication.
Fact-finding-in the sense suggested by the Supreme Court in
Cooper-involves making probabilistic judgments about the
existence or nonexistence of postulated historical events.257 Because
these events occurred in the past, there is no way to test them and
conclusively establish their existence or nonexistence. Any decision
about them will necessarily be speculative. Nevertheless, our
system requires conclusive judgments about them. Professor
Geoffrey Hazard has explained how courts deal with this dilemma:
The facts in a legal dispute usually are past events that,
having occurred in their own time and circumstance,
now are eclipsed by succeeding events and exist only in
partial and partisan memories. When an injunction is
under consideration, the relevant events are prospective
and in a strict sense wholly imaginary. A court there-
fore does not "find" facts. It postulates them by an
official process-a trial, in which the legal system
pronounces on the basis of imperfect evidence what will
be considered perfect truth. The transformation from
indeterminacy to certainty is presented as empirical
inquiry and discovery, and indeed, a trial involves both
inquiry and discovery. But the transformation into
certainty also entails an unavoidable element of official
fiat and thus an institutional and political element. The
facts are as the court says they are. The ultimate reason
why the court's ipse dixit prevails is because the pro-
nouncement is ex officio and the political sovereign has
said through organic law that judicial pronouncements
shall prevail."'
257 See supra notes 213-30 and accompanying text.
258 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Preclusion as to Issues of Law: The Legal System's Interest,
70 IOWA L. REV. 81, 82 (1984).
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In other words, the lynchpin of our system of dispute resolution is
finality. We cannot actually know with certainty what happened or
what will happen, so we proclaim an outcome and then preclude
reconsideration of that outcome. 9
This kind of absolute finality is not required for most of the
decisions made in adjudication. It is required only with respect to
those events on which the parties have staked their claims and
defenses. That is, it is required only with respect to historical (or
sometimes future) events that the parties claim trigger the applica-
tion of legal rules. Other matters more commonly considered issues
of law, such as the meaning of statutes or of decisions made by other
courts, and the policy implications of formulating legal rules in
particular ways, must be resolved for that dispute but can change
over time.260 Unlike specific past or future events, those matters are
subject to ongoing interpretation and application, and as circum-
stances in the world change, the interpretation and application can
change."6'
For finality to have its desired effect, the judicial system must
provide a decisionmaking method that both the parties and society
" See JONAKAIT, supra note 32, at 75 ("We want disputants and others to accept court
determinations so that the dispute ends and is not continued outside the courtroom.").
20 Professor Hazard describes the lesser degree of finality required for these questions
of law as follows:
In a sense, to which Holmes adverted, rules of law do not "exist" but are
only forecasts of the terms in which the power of the state will be brought
to bear if push comes to shove. In a strict chronological or existential
sense, the law that "is" when a transaction occurs is not the same law that
"is" when the transaction is sued on, or the same law that "is" when the
suit goes to judgment. For many reasons, however, it is useful, indeed
institutionally vital, to ignore these discontinuities. It is morally
intolerable that the incidence of the state's authority appears to depend
simply on the date at which it is exercised. Therefore, the social order
undertakes to say that rules of law exist intertemporally-that the law
has been, is, and shall continue to be-and that the rules will be consis-
tently applied regardless of the temporal sequence of events.
Hazard, supra note 258, at 82.
261 But see id. at 88 (arguing that decisions on questions of fact have less entitlement to
finality than decisions on questions of law because judges learn about law 'through direct
judicial perception, not by perception through the medium of informants, which is how a court
apprehends the facts of a case"). For a criticism of Hazard's argument, see Ronald J. Allen
& Michael S. Pardo, Facts in Law and Facts of Law, 7 INT'L J. EVID. & PROOF 153, 162 (2003)
(arguing that issues of law are ambiguous or unclear and that Hazard fails to distinguish this
from factual questions, where there is conflicting evidence).
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will accept as final. The jury trial is the method we have created for
that purpose. Randolph Jonakait describes the legitimating
function of the jury in these terms:
A community is more likely to accept verdicts when the
decisions reflect or incorporate societal norms. The jury,
as both the symbolic and actual representative of the
community, is more likely to render verdicts based on
widely accepted standards than are other authorities.
The shared responsibility of a jury verdict also aids its
acceptance within the community. When a single judge
makes a legal determination that produces dissatisfac-
tion, the discontent centers on that individual decision
maker. The displeased can see the outcome as resulting
from one person's whims, caprices, prejudices, stupidity,
or lack of common sense. With the shared accountability
of a jury's decision, however, the locus of any discontent
is more diffuse and, consequently, less intense.262
Because juries are generally perceived to be neutral and because
social science research shows that even losing disputants will accept
the outcome if they believe the process was fair,263 juries help
guarantee acceptability for the parties, as well as for the commu-
nity.
Beyond this acceptability argument, a further reason for
assigning fact questions to the jury is the jury's apparent compe-
tence at deciding them. While there is much conflicting evidence,
social science research suggests that juries have certain clear
decisionmaking advantages over individuals when it comes to
drawing inferences about past events based on incomplete evidence.
Perhaps most importantly, groups are able to remember and
interpret evidence more fully than individuals.2
262 JONAKAIT, supra note 32, at 76.
263 See id. at 80 (reviewing research).
264 See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 236 (1983) ("The group memory advantage
over the typical or even the exceptional individual is one of the major determinants of the
superiority of the jury as a legal decision mechanism.").
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Furthermore, the diversity of the jury may make it a better fact-
finder. Individuals, including individual judges, have biases and
prejudices that can cloud their judgment. The impact of those
biases and prejudices is reduced in a group setting where multiple
perspectives may be brought to bear. 65
The point of this discussion is not to argue that juries are perfect
266decisionmakers or even the best decisionmakers for all purposes.
Rather, it is to show that sound reasons exist to support our
traditional assignment of questions of fact to juries. Making the
jury the primary-if not the sole-decider of facts in both civil and
criminal cases would produce a variety of positive results. It would
achieve logical consistency in what civil and criminal litigants may
expect from the adjudicatory process. It would improve the
acceptability of the results flowing from that process. It might
improve the quality of the decisionmaking. And it would do all this
while maintaining the fundamental precepts of our legal system as
established in our Constitution.
V. PRACTICAL ISSUES IN ASSIGNING QUESTIONS OF
FACT AT SENTENCING TO THE JURY
In recent years, several scholars have called for full jury
sentencing. They have advocated giving juries rather than judges
the power to set sentences within statutory ranges. That is not
my objective. My focus is on fact questions. Judges are well
positioned-that is, better positioned than juries-to make the
systemic judgments, based on matters such as traditional practice,
legislative intent, and judicial precedent, necessary to apply legal
265 See JONAKAIT, supra note 32, at 46-49 (discussingjuries' ability to overcome biases and
prejudices).
266 For a good overview of empirical studies examining whether juries differ in predictable
ways from judges in sentencing patterns, see generally Adriaan Lanni, Jury Sentencing in
Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775 (1999). The
author concludes that "[the studies do not support the popular assumption that juries mete
out harsher, more disparate, and more racially biased punishments than judges." Id. at 1790.
267 Hoffinan, supra note 31, at 951; Lanni, supra note 266, at 1775. A handful of states
currently use jury sentencing, including Arkansas, Missouri, and Virginia. See Lanni, supra
note 266, at 1791 (noting that these states revamped, rather than outright abolished, their
jury sentencing schemes in early 1990s).
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rules to established facts. Judges are not as well positioned as
juries to determine those facts. Accordingly, my objective is not jury
sentencing, but jury determination of the fact questions pertinent to
the imposition of sentence. And this has also been the Supreme
Court's focus. The rule that the Court announced in Apprendi,
extended in Blakely, and ostensibly reaffirmed in Booker addresses
only fact questions.268 The Court held that any fact that increases
the maximum allowable sentence must be decided by the jury.269
The Breyer majority's constitutional remedy effectively neutral-
izes that holding."' By allowing the Guidelines to operate as
discretionary guidelines rather than mandatory rules, that remedy
allows judges to continue to determine all the matters they deter-
mined prior to Blakely. The remedy suggested by Justice Stevens
would be somewhat better. Stevens emphasized that "judicial
factfinding to support an offense level determination or an enhance-
ment is only unconstitutional when that finding raises the sentence
beyond the sentence that could have lawfully been imposed by
reference to facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant."27'
In Stevens's view, a judge could always follow the Guidelines to set
the base offense level dictated by the offense for which the defen-
dant was convicted. 2 The base offense level, when matched with
a criminal history category, provides for a fairly large range of
possible sentences. The judge could then find facts to set the
sentence within that range. Even if the facts exceeded those found
by the jury, and even if the judge's fact-finding called for an increase
in the offense level, the resulting sentence would be constitutional
as long as it did not exceed the maximum allowable sentence as
determined from the base offense level.
Stevens's remedy, while better than the majority's, still gives
judges too much decisional authority. Its flaw lies in its failure to
268 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
269 Id.
270 See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text (discussing second part of Booker, which
made Guidelines advisory).
271 United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738,775 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
272 Id.
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contemplate meaningfully the definition of "question of fact."
Stevens cites Apprendi and Blakely for the proposition that juries
must determine the "facts" triggering an increase in the maximum
allowable sentence.273 But neither he nor the Court in its earlier
opinions ever explains what a question of fact is. The Court simply
assumes that the questions of fact that the jury must decide are self-
evident. In this section, I will suggest a narrow way to define
"questions of fact" designed to reach only those matters at the very
heart of the jury right. I will then show how adoption of that
approach leads to a different approach to sentencing under the
Guidelines than that proposed by Stevens. Finally, I will address
some of the issues my approach would raise regarding the imple-
mentation of jury fact-finding at the sentencing stage, such as how
and when to submit issues for thejury's consideration, the appropri-
ate standard of proof, and the possibilities for waiver. I will offer
some suggestions on these issues, but my main objective is to point
out some of the key problem areas that need to be thought through
if an expanded jury right were to be implemented.
A. IDENTIFYING THE QUESTIONS OF FACT THE JURY SHOULD DECIDE AT
SENTENCING
Modern scholars have criticized the fact-law distinction as an
artificial construct that simply serves to mask or justify normative
conclusions about which actor is better situated to decide a particu-
lar question.274 In a recent article, Professor Ronald Allen and
Michael Pardo conduct a comprehensive review of both case law
invoking the fact-law distinction and scholarship attempting to
explain the distinction.275 They forcefully demonstrate that there is
no ontological, epistemological, or analytical distinction between
273 Id.
274 See supra notes 179-80 (citing articles critical of fact-law distinction).
275 See generally Allen & Pardo, supra note 180 (chronicling history of fact-law
distinction). Allen and Pardo's analysis rests on several insights: that everything we think
of as law exists and requires proof through evidence just like all the things that we think of
as facts, that fact-finding requires the invocation of norms just like the identification of legal
rules does, and that propositions of law have truth values just like propositions of "fact." Id.
at 1805-06. See also Allen & Pardo, supra note 261, at 153-54 (noting fallacies of fact-law
distinction in Western legal systems).
948 [Vol. 39:895
SENTENCING FACTS AFTER BOOKER
things in the real world that are facts and things in the real world
that are law.27 Allen and Pardo conclude that when judges use the
terms "fact" and "law," they are using those terms conventionally to
describe a normative conclusion that a particular matter should be
decided by a judge (law) or should be decided by a jury (fact). 7
These claims are undoubtedly correct. The question of what
constitutes valid law in any given context is a factual question, and
one that can be answered only by examining the activities of legal
officials in their identification of law. Law is a social institution
manifested in and constructed by the actions of legal actors. It is,
therefore, thoroughly factual in nature. Efforts to distinguish laws
from facts at this level-in relation to questions about the nature of
law-will always fail. That does not mean, however, that it is
impossible to distinguish "questions of law" from "questions of fact"
as those terms are and traditionally have been used by judges in
practice. In fact, judges make those distinctions in fundamentally
consistent ways all the time. As proof of that point, consider the
following two questions: (1) "How fast was the car going?" and
(2) "What was the speed limit?" We do not have to believe that law
and fact are severable ontological categories to recognize that any
judge encountering those questions in a typical adjudicative context
would label the first one a question of fact and the second a question
of law. The challenge is to identify the characteristics of the
questions that judges typically label "law" or "fact."
As I have argued extensively elsewhere, in the civil context,
questions of fact are determined by reference to the "transactions or
occurrences in dispute."278 In an adversarial system such as ours,
the decisionmaker, whether judge, jury, or some other referee, does
not have the power to seek out and resolve disputes. The parties
must invoke the machinery of adjudication by bringing their dispute
276 See Allen & Pardo, supra note 180, at 1790-1806 (rebutting ontological, analytical, and
epistemological distinctions between fact and law).
277 See id. at 1778 ("[Olne might suppose that courts utilizing the [fact-law] distinction
(such as the Court in Cooper) were appealing to a relatively secure foundation. However, this
has not been the case, for what is now a familiar reason: the legal system makes pragmatic
allocative choices in the guise of principled analysis.").
271 Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh
Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1125 (2003).
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to a proper forum.2 79 In civil cases, the plaintiff must always assert
that some event or condition occurred and impacted the plaintiff or
will impact the plaintiff in a negative way. The plaintiff thus sets
the terms of the debate by identifying something that happened (or
in some cases, will happen) causing an injury that the plaintiff
claims is remediable in a court of law. The defendant responds by
challenging the plaintiffs version of the events and adding new
events or conditions that have a logical connection to those posited
by the plaintiff and that are necessary for a full understanding of
the events or conditions described by the plaintiff. The transactions
or occurrences in dispute are simply the events or conditions that
the plaintiff has pointed to as causing his injury, plus the injury
itself, plus logically connected events or conditions identified by the
defendant.8 °
When judges in civil cases talk about questions of fact, they are
talking about questions requiring inductive inferences about the
transactions or occurrences in dispute. That is, they are talking
about questions that require a decisionmaker to make probabilistic
judgments about whether events in the real world happened, might
have happened, or will happen. Other decisions-those involving
deductive inferences"' or inductive inferences about matter such as
the intentions of legislatures, the holdings of other courts, or the
social consequences of postulated adjudicative decisions-do not
constitute questions of fact.28 2
Criminal law differs from civil law in important ways. Whether
the justification for civil law is rooted in utilitarianism or in either
corrective or distributive justice, its primary function is the
compensation of private injuries. The existence of an injury is the
279 Id. at 1147.
2s Id. at 1158-60.
2 Unlike inductive inferences, deductive inferences do not require probabilistic
judgments. The following syllogism is an example: Anyone who intentionally and unlawfully
kills a human being is guilty of murder; A intentionally and unlawfully killed B; therefore,
A is guilty of murder.
Once the decisionmaker knows that murder is defined as "the intentional and unlawful
killing of a human being" and knows that a particular defendant has intentionally and
unlawfully killed another, the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of murder follows
without any conjecture or speculation required. For other examples of deductive reasoning
in adjudication, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-43 (1990).
282 See Kirgis, supra note 278, at 1160 (describing questions of law).
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precondition to the maintenance of a civil action. The lawsuit is the
attempt by the injured party to recover from the injuring party, and
the nature of the injury defines the terms of the lawsuit. The injury
is thus the central fact from which everything flows. That is why in
my formulation of fact questions the transactions or occurrences in
dispute consist of the injury plus those events or conditions
identified by the parties as logically connected to the injury.
In criminal adjudication, however, the injury is not always as
apparent or as central to the process. Some crimes are victim-
less-they do not cause an identifiable compensable injury. Even
where there is a clear and identifiable injury, the injured party does
not initiate the litigation. The state, having defined the offense,
initiates the litigation with the consequence that society as a whole
has interests at stake. Compensation for an injury to a private
party is not the touchstone of criminal adjudication, as it is in civil
adjudication. Instead, the focus of criminal adjudication is on
society's interest in punishing and deterring the wrongdoer.
Given that difference, the method I have suggested of identifying
fact questions in civil cases-by reference to the transactions or
occurrences in dispute-will not precisely fit the criminal context.
The transactions and occurrences in dispute in civil cases are not
the equivalent of the central issues in dispute in criminal cases.
Nevertheless, the basic concerns that underlie the choice between
judge and jury pertain in both civil and criminal cases. Because of
that fundamental consistency, it is possible to translate the test for
identifying fact questions in civil cases into the criminal context.
The central function of criminal law is the punishment of
culpable wrongs." 3 Because our society values individual liberty
and because the criminalization of conduct constricts individual
liberty, the decision by a legislature to criminalize conduct must be
justified by reference to some competing value.284 Legal theorists
m See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 168
(discussing culpability). Moore defines "wrongdoing" as "constructed out of the elements of
action, causation, and (lack of) justification." Id. He defines "culpability" as consisting of"the
mental states with which an action may be done, and with the (lack of) excuse for the
otherwise culpable doing of a wrongful action." Id. I will use the term "wrongs" to
incorporate both those concepts.
284 See id. at 282 ("[Tlhe good of punishing culpable wrongdoers must outweigh the bad
of coercively interfering with choice.").
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differ on the values that may justify the constriction of individual
liberty, but most would agree that retribution for wrongs ranks high
on the list of current justifications for criminal law. Virtually all
would accept that some combination of the following four categories
of wrongs warrant retribution: (1) harms to others, (2) acts that
give offense to others, (3) harms to the wrongdoer herself, and (4)
moral offenses.28 5
While the focus of civil adjudication is on an identifiable injury,
the focus of criminal adjudication is on the wrong allegedly commit-
ted by the defendant. For offenses falling within the first three
categories of wrongs, the circumstances of the wrong generally are
easily identified. The wrong consists of the harm the victim
suffered, the offense caused by the defendant's act, or the harm the
defendant visited on himself. For offenses, such as tax fraud, that
harm the public rather than a specific individual victim, the wrong
consists of the harm to the joint public interest.286  For attempt
crimes in all of these categories, the wrong consists of the harm or
offense that would have occurred if the defendant's act had its
intended effect.287
Offenses in the fourth category, moral offenses, are by definition
victimless. There is no apparent harm. Still, in most cases the
circumstances of the wrong are evident. Examples of this category
include incest between consenting adults2 8  and voluntary
participation in private sado-masochistic sex shows.289 For these
2 See generally 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
OTHERS (1984) (describing criminal law regarding crimes involving harm to others); 2 JOEL
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985) (describing
criminal law regarding crimes involving offense to others); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF (1986) (describing criminal law regarding crimes
including harm to offender); 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988) (describing criminal law regarding crimes considered moral
offenses).
m8 See 4 FEINBERG, supra note 285, at 33 (discussing tax fraud as example of public harm
causing public grievance).
287 Contra MOORE, supra note 283, at 193. Moore argues that attempt crimes do not
constitute wrongs, but nevertheless make the offender culpable. Id. I find this distinction
unpersuasive. A person who attempts to kill another has indeed committed a wrong.
See 4 FEINBERG, supra note 285, at 20 (using incest as example of violating societal
taboo).
m See id. at 126-28 (discussing examples of actions that are deemed generically and
morally evil).
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crimes, the wrong consists of engaging in conduct that violates
society's moral standards. Harm is not required because the
conduct itself is inherently wrong.
Legislatures define wrongs, and they have very wide latitude in
doing so. Subject to limits imposed by the Constitution, most
notably by the implied right of privacy,"9 legislatures may
criminalize almost anything. But they must clearly identify the
wrongs they have chosen to proscribe, so that citizens have suffi-
cient warning to avoid conduct that will provoke society's retribu-
tion. The criminal law must make clear exactly what conduct
constitutes the wrong by designating the harm to others, offense to
others, harm to self, or moral offense constituting the wrong.
This emphasis on the wrong makes possible the delineation of a
category of questions of fact. Criminal punishment is justified only
if the defendant actually committed the wrong with which he is
charged. If the defendant is not morally culpable-if he has not
committed the wrong-he does not deserve society's retribution.29 '
The circumstances surrounding the wrong are the essential factual
issues in a criminal case. If a question of fact in a civil action is one
requiring inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences
in dispute, defined in relation to the injury suffered by the plaintiff,
the corollary proposition is that a question of fact in a criminal
action is one requiring inductive inferences about the wrong with
which the defendant is charged. To identify the questions of fact in
a criminal case, we must start with the wrong and then incorporate
all matters raised by the parties that are logically connected to that
wrong. For example, with a murder charge we begin with the
killing of a human being and then consider the logically related
conduct of the defendant, the victim, and other involved parties
surrounding that event; the defendant's mental state; and any
mitigating factors raised by the defendant, such as circumstances
that might justify or excuse the killing. Questions requiring
inductive inferences about those matters are questions of fact, which
290 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas sodomy law
on privacy grounds).
291 See MOORE, supra note 283, at 91 (explaining retributivist approach to punishment).
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must go to the jury whether raised in the liability or sentencing
phase of the trial.
It should be apparent that these are not the only questions that
juries decide in criminal cases. Juries do not merely decide whether
the circumstances surrounding the wrong occurred in the way
claimed by the prosecution. Juries also decide whether to apply the
governing legal rules so as to hold the defendant criminally
responsible for that conduct. Where the jury decides to acquit, their
decision is final. The judge may not disturb it. Where the jury
decides to convict, on the other hand, the judge has the power to
overrule them and grant an acquittal. These decisions involve
questions of law. Once the decisionmaker has determined what
happened in the real world, the application of rules of law to those
facts involves a combination of deductive inferences and inductive
inferences about matters such as community standards of behavior,
need for deterrence, and legislative intent. These are questions of
law, not questions of fact, because they do not involve inductive
inferences about the circumstances of the wrong.292
Courts are free to give those questions to juries, and again, the
decision to convict must always be made by the jury in a case in
which the right to a jury is properly invoked. But the right to have
a jury decide questions of law was not a part of the Apprendi line of
cases. The Supreme Court has not said that the jury must decide
every question of law pertinent to the imposition of criminal
punishment. The Court has said that the jury must decide the facts
pertinent to the sentence imposed.293
B. QUESTIONS OF FACT IN THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Under the holding-if not the logic--of Booker, judicial
decisionmaking under the Guidelines seems safe from constitutional
challenge.294 If juries were given all fact questions pertinent to the
292 See Kirgis, supra note 278, at 1146-60 (explaining distinction between questions of fact
and questions of law in civil cases).
293 See supra notes 12, 17 and accompanying text.
29 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1. 1(c) (2004) (providing that "sentence
may be imposed at any point within the applicable guideline range, provided that the
sentence ... is not greater than the statutorily authorized maximum sentence").
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imposition of sentence, however, significant changes in sentencing
practice would be required. Many of the matters that judges
currently decide when applying the Guidelines constitute fact
questions, as I define that term, and would have to be decided by the
jury, at least in cases in which the jury right has been properly
invoked.
The Guidelines work by assigning points to various offenses and
then translating those points into specific sentences.295 Initially,
each offense for which a defendant has been convicted is assigned a
set point value called a "base offense level."296 Then points are
added to or subtracted from the base offense level based on a variety
of factors.297 Technically, these modifications come in three types.
First, the base offense level is modified to take into account the
"specific offense characteristics."29 s Specific offense characteristics
include matters such as whether a firearm was discharged in the
course of an assault299 or whether the victim of a sexual assault
suffered serious bodily injury.300 Next, "adjustments" are made to
the offense level. Adjustments are factors that are not offense
specific such as whether the defendant played an organizing role in
the offense 30 1 or was merely a minimal participant,3 2 or whether the
defendant obstructed justice in the investigation and prosecution of
the offense.3 °3
These three factors, base offense level, specific offense character-
istics, and adjustments, combine to provide the "offense level." To
derive the sentencing range, the offense level is then adjusted to
account for the defendant's criminal history category.0 4 The
defendant fits into one of six criminal history categories, depending
on consideration of matters such as the number of prior crimes, the
seriousness of those crimes, and whether the defendant is a "career
295 Id. § 1BI.1 (describing general application principles).
Id. § 1B.A(b).
27 id.
2W Id.
299 Id. § 2A2.2(b)(2).
3w' Id. § 2A3.1(b)(4).
so' Id. § 3B1.1.
3o2 Id. § 3B1.2.
30 Id. § 3C1.1.
s Id. § 4A.
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offender."30 1 Using a sentencing table with offense level on one axis
and criminal history category on the other, the judge determines the
applicable sentencing range measured in months of imprison-
ment.3 °6
The sentencing range provides the "heartland" within which the
sentence should fall in a typical case.3 7 But the Guidelines also
provide for departures from the prescribed sentencing range in
unusual cases. As a general matter, departures are permissible
where "there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that described."3 M The Guide-
lines permit departures on a number of specific grounds. The most
common ground is "substantial assistance to authorities," under
which the defendant may receive a sentence below the prescribed
range if he cooperates in securing convictions of other defendants.3 9
Other grounds include aggravating factors such as seriousness of
the offense, use of weapons, and extreme conduct by the
defendant, 310 and mitigating factors such as the victim's conduct and
whether the defendant was acting under duress or with diminished
capacity.31'
With the exception of adjustments based on hate crime motiva-
tion,312 all the determinations necessary to arrive at the sentence
are to be made by the judge. In making these determinations, the
judge is to consider all "relevant conduct," which includes not just
the elements of the convicted crime, but "all acts and omissions
committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant" and "in the case of
a jointly undertaken criminal activity.., all reasonably foreseeable
acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken
305 Id. § 4B1.1.
306 See id. ch. 5 pt. A (providing table of figures for sentencing determination).
307 See id. ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(b) (describing when judge may depart from specified
sentence).
30" 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000).
3o' U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004).
3'0 Id. §§ 5K2.1-5K2.3, 5K2.6, 5K2.8.
311 Id. §§ 5K2.10, 5K2.12-5K2.13.
312 Id. § 3Al.1.
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criminal activity."313 Evidence may include "without limitation, any
information concerning the background, character and conduct of
the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law."3 14 While the
Guidelines do not express a particular standard of proof on these
matters, the Sentencing Commission said in its commentary to the
Guidelines that it believes a preponderance of the evidence standard
satisfies due process,315 and courts seem to have adopted that
position.316 Booker effectively ratifies that system, while giving
judges greater flexibility to depart.
Were courts to give juries all questions requiring inductive
inferences about the wrong, much in this process would have to
change. Offense-related factors represent by far the most important
considerations in the sentencing determination. At each step-from
establishing the offense level, through making adjustments, to
considering departures-the sentencing judge is invited to consider
the circumstances surrounding the offense. This includes matters
such as the use of weapons, planning, and motive, as well as the
nature and severity of the injury suffered by the victim. Questions
about these matters touch directly on the wrong of which the
defendant was accused. For example, the judge must determine
whether a defendant convicted of criminal sexual abuse
"knowing[ly] misrepresentied] ... a participant's identity" in order
to "persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in prohib-
ited sexual conduct."317 Answering this question requires probabilis-
tic inferences about what the defendant did (was there really a
misrepresentation?), what the defendant knew (did the defendant
know he was making a misrepresentation?), and what the defendant
intended (was the purpose of the misrepresentation to induce sexual
conduct?). These matters clearly constitute questions of fact in the
sense I advocate. Other examples of similar "factual" determinations
311 Id. § 1B1.3.
314 Id. § 1B1.4. The information a court relies on need not be admissible at trial as long
as it has "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy." Id. § 6A1.3(a).
311 Id. § 6A1.3 cmt. background.
311 See Joseph P. Sargent, The Standard of Proof Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Raising the Standard to Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
463, 466 (1993) (citing cases in which courts used preponderance of evidence standard when
applying guidelines).
311 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A3.1(b)(6) (2004).
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abound throughout the Guidelines. All of those determinations
would have to be made by the jury at some point in the process if the
defendant has properly invoked a right to a jury trial and the result
of the determination would be an increase in the maximum
allowable sentence.
On the other hand, much in the Guidelines would remain
unaffected by the change I propose. Most importantly, the determi-
nation of the defendant's criminal history could remain the province
of the judge. While criminal history is a fact in the colloquial sense
of the term, it is not the sort of question of fact that lies at the core
of the jury right. Except in cases in which a statute conditions
criminal liability on felon status, the defendant's prior criminal acts
are not part of the wrong of which the defendant is accused. In fact,
the law of evidence specifically precludes the jury from hearing
about the defendant's prior conduct unless that conduct is directly
probative of the events the parties have identified as triggering the
legal rules at issue. The reason for that limitation is that we have
made a conscious choice to impose guilt for bad conduct rather than
for being a bad person. Even where character evidence is allowed,
we do not allow the jury to hear evidence of past conduct as proof of
that character because of the potential for that evidence to distract
the jury and unduly complicate the proceedings.
Because the goals of criminal punishment include both specific
deterrence and incapacitation, any sentencing authority must
evaluate matters beyond the specific conduct on which guilt is
based. The defendant's personal character takes on a heightened
importance, as the sentencing authority must determine the
defendant's tendency toward recidivism. That determination
depends on the accurate assessment of the defendant's past conduct.
While juries could, in theory, make those assessments, the same
pragmatic concerns about inefficiency and confusion of issues that
exclude evidence of prior acts as proof of character in the liability
phase militate toward judicial determinations of prior conduct for
purposes of sentencing. Thus, when the Supreme Court held in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States that a defendant could be
sentenced based on a determination of recidivism that was not
[Vol. 39:895958
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pleaded and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it announced a rule
consistent with my approach to the Sixth Amendment.318
Furthermore, while many of the determinations required to set
the sentencing range could not be made by the judge under my
approach, the specification of a determinate sentence within that
range could remain in the judge's hands. The Sentencing Commis-
sion stated that "[iin determining the type of sentence to impose, the
sentencing judge should consider the nature and seriousness of the
conduct, the statutory purposes of sentencing, and the pertinent
offender characteristics."319 In spelling out the statutory purposes
of sentencing, Congress directed courts to consider the need
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner .... 320
Assuming the circumstances of the crime have already been
established, these determinations do not require further fact-finding
that should be done by the jury. The judge evaluates the serious-
ness of the offense by comparing the defendant's conduct with social
norms and with the judge's sense of moral responsibility. The
assessment of the need for general and specific deterrence involves
inferences about the likelihood of other people and this defendant,
respectively, committing similar crimes in the future. And consider-
ation of the possibility for rehabilitation involves inferences about
the defendant's circumstances, history, and mental and physical
condition. Finally, sentencing will always take into account the
sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants, a matter that
involves inferences about other prosecutions and reported cases.
3"' 523 U.S. 224, 247-48 (1998).
3'9 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2004).
320 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000).
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Significantly, giving fact questions that arise at sentencing to the
jury would leave judges with discretion to make many of the same
sorts of findings that characterized sentencing decisions prior to the
adoption of the Guidelines. The rehabilitative sentencing model in
ascendancy prior to the adoption of the Guidelines was defendant-
oriented, in the sense that the judge's focus in the sentencing stage
was on the defendant's characteristics. Judges sentencing under the
rehabilitative model typically considered the circumstances of the
offense in order to assess the defendant's moral culpability and the
risk to society. Butjudges seem to have relied primarily on the facts
stated in the indictment (in the case of guilty pleas) or on the
elements of the crime as proved to the jury.32' To the extent judges
relied on new information in sentencing, they emphasized matters
such as the defendant's work history, family situation, education,
and criminal history.322 The Supreme Court in Williams v. New
321 Evidence for this proposition comes from the fact that presentence investigations in
the pre-Guidelines era typically did not involve detailed investigations of the circumstances
of the offense. See Julian Abele Cook, Jr., The Changing Role of the Probation Officer in the
Federal Court, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 112, 112 (1991)
To the defendant, the probation officer before the guidelines was viewed
as a neutral-standing between the defense counsel and the prosecutor,
serving as a conduit for pertinent information to the sentencing judge. To
the judge, the probation officer provided much needed background
information about the defendant, and served as a consultant with regard
to the laws, sentencing regulations and policies that could affect the
sentence.
Id.
322 See Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should
Meet the Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 299, 313-14 (1994) (describing sentencing process prior
to adoption of Guidelines). Professor Young describes the proof process at sentencing prior
to the Guidelines in these terms:
A defendant might present past achievements in education and employ-
ment, relationship to the community, and relationship to family.
Evidence of these factors often was simply an oral summary by defense
counsel at sentencing. Letters of support for the defendant from family,
employers, or neighbors were common. Ongoing responsibilities of the
defendant that would be impeded by incarceration were also brought to
the attention of the court, particularly the need to support a family by
continued employment. Because there were no limits on what a court
could choose to consider as a basis for sentencing, anecdotal evidence on
any topic could be presented.
The prosecution also relied on anecdotal evidence, commonly to show
the defendant's other past transgressions, including previously uncharged
conduct. The prosecution might also describe the terrible crime or drug
or fraud problem in America and the outrageous part this defendant had
960
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York expressly approved this focus on the defendant's characteris-
tics: "[Hlighly relevant-if not essential-to [the judge's] selection
of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest informa-
tion possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics."323
In large measure, the Guidelines represent a shift from that
defendant-oriented sentencing model to an offense-oriented model.
With the exception of criminal history, almost all the factors the
Guidelines use to determine the appropriate sentencing range
involve consideration of the circumstances of the offense.324 Indeed,
the Guidelines expressly proscribe-for purposes of setting the
offense level and making departures-consideration of aspects of the
defendant's background such as age, education, mental or physical
condition, employment history, or family circumstances.3 2 5  This
shift in emphasis was motivated by a concern that the wide
discretion permitted under the rehabilitative model was producing
unjustifiable disparities in sentencing.326 The focus on offense
characteristics rather than the defendant's characteristics is an
aspect of the shift toward a retributive model of punishment.
In effect, my argument is that an offense-oriented sentencing
model cannot survive constitutional scrutiny if thejudge is given the
authority to make factual determinations about the circumstances
of the offense. Judges are the appropriate actors to make determi-
nations about the seriousness of the offense-as a moral and societal
matter-for purposes of ensuring that the defendant gets his "just
played in the great crime wave. Because the judge could seize on any
aspect of information presented, without even acknowledging it, and
adjust a sentence, prosecutors and defendants brought in a wide array of
evidence hoping something would favorably influence the judge.
Id.
323 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
324 Substantial assistance does not focus on the offense, but it is really a separate category
because it is included in the calculation for utilitarian reasons rather than as an aspect of
punishment. See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and
Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (discussing role of cooperation with prosecutors in
sentencing).
325 U.S. SENTENCINGGUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1. 1-5H1.6 (2004). The Guidelines provide
that these factors may be considered "in determining the conditions of probation or supervised
release." Id. The defendant's race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and social status may
never be considered. Id. § 5H1.10.
326 See Ogletree, supra note 85, at 1941-43 (discussing changes in sentencing philosophy
leading to promulgation of Guidelines).
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deserts." Judges are also the appropriate actors to make determina-
tions about the defendant's personal circumstances and character
in order to determine the social utility of incarcerating or otherwise
punishing the defendant. They are not the appropriate actors to
decide what happened to trigger punishment where the defendant
has properly invoked her right to a jury trial.
Obviously, taking away those fact questions would leave judges
with significantly less decisionmaking authority than they will have
under Justice Breyer's Booker holding. But it would also leave
judges with less authority than they would have under Justice
Stevens's remedy. Stevens would allow judges to make any
determinations, including those involving fact questions, as long as
the resulting sentence is within the range allowable given the base
offense level for the crime for which the defendant was convicted.327
In my view, judges simply should not make determinations of fact
questions. So a judge should not make a determination about, for
example, the amount of money embezzled, regardless of where the
resulting sentence would fall within a given sentence range. But a
judge could make any determination about matters not involving
fact questions, including the moral seriousness of the crime as
demonstrated by predetermined conclusions about what happened,
the defendant's criminal history, and other factors such as the
defendant's acceptance of responsibility and substantial assistance
to prosecutors.
C. IMPLEMENTING JURY FACT-FINDING AT SENTENCING
My contention is that the Sixth Amendment should be read to
include within the jury right the power to determine the historical
events surrounding the wrong of which the defendant is accused,
whether those events are relevant at the liability or the penalty
phase of the proceeding. Whenever a defendant has properly
exercised her right to a jury trial, the jury should certainly make
those determinations. The easiest way for that to happen is to treat
all offense-related considerations as elements of the crime and to
prove them to the jury at the same time that the jury determines
327 See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
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the basic culpability issue. In many cases, however, lumping what
are currently considered sentencing factors in with the culpability
determination will hurt the defendant. As Jacqueline Ross has
argued, the pre-Apprendi system gave the defendant the advantage
of remaining silent while culpability was determined at trial and
then presenting mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase.328
Under Apprendi, defendants face a Hobson's choice of allowing the
prosecution's evidence on sentencing factors such as drug quantity
to go unchallenged or presenting evidence on those matters and
thereby implicitly conceding culpability.
329
Beyond that concern, an even greater problem is the fact that
jury trials rarely occur. Well over 90% of criminal convictions are
the result of plea bargains. 3 If judges are to take the circum-
stances of the offense into account-as our current sentencing model
indicates-conclusions must be drawn about the facts of the case in
plea-bargained cases as well.
This could happen in several ways. The most obvious is to treat
the many offense-related factors as elements that must be pleaded
in the indictment. Then, when the defendant pleads guilty, he
pleads to an offense that includes the relevant sentencing consider-
ations. That is how prosecutors and courts have responded to
Apprendi with respect to statutes that allow for increases in the
maximum penalty based on statutory aggravators that would
previously have been determined by the judge at sentencing. In the
most prominent example, prosecutors now plead in the indictment
the amount of drugs that they allege the defendant possessed or
sold. Prosecutors could also plead such Guidelines-denominated
factors as seriousness of the injury to the victim, amount of money
embezzled, or pecuniary motive.
The criticism of this approach is that it gives inordinate power to
prosecutors. Professor Stephanos Bibas explains:
321 Jacqueline E. Ross, Unanticipated Consequences of Turning Sentencing Factors into
Offense Elements: The Apprendi Debate, 12 FED. SENTENTENCING REP. 197, 198-99 (2000).
329 Id.
m See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 772 (2005) (stating that "over 95% of all
federal criminal prosecutions are terminated by a plea bargain") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Even before Apprendi, prosecutors used statutory
minima and maxima to charge bargain where multiple
offenses overlapped. Apprendi poured fuel on that fire
by fragmenting crimes, creating more minima and
maxima and thus more ways to charge bargain. For
example, the maximum federal sentence for carjacking
is fifteen years, or twenty-five years if a victim suffers
serious bodily injury, or life imprisonment (or death) if
a victim dies. Courts used to interpret this statute as a
single crime plus two sentence-enhancement provisions.
But now, under the Apprendi rule, each enhancement is
an element of a distinct offense. In other words, what
used to be a single crime is now three separate crimes.
Prosecutors now have more power to exploit these
varying minima and maxima as bargaining chips. They
can do so by charging one favored defendant with the
lowest grade of a crime (subject to the lowest minimum
and maximum) while charging an identical defendant
with a higher grade. If a minimum or maximum applies,
the judge's hands are tied regardless of the true serious-
ness of the offense. Prosecutors thus have more power to
use collusive charge bargains to set sentence levels
unilaterally, and judges have less power to check
them.
33 1
To the extent this is a real problem now, it would become a much
greater one if all the many offense-related factors in the Guidelines
were treated as elements to be charged and subsequently bargained.
In what would be a radical departure from the current system of
charge bargaining, prosecutors and defendants would haggle over
the facts of the offense, thereby tying the hands of the judge at
sentencing. A major innovation of the Guidelines-the move toward
"real offense sentencing"332
-would be lost.
31 Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA L.
REv. 465, 472 (2002).
332 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § ch. 1, pt. A introductory cmt. (2004)
(describing efforts of Sentencing Commission to develop "real offense sentencing" system in
Guidelines).
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Of course, not everyone would agree that giving prosecutors and
defendants greater bargaining autonomy is a bad thing. Clearly a
move in that direction would give prosecutors more power vis-a-vis
judges. But it would also give defendants more power and, perhaps
more importantly, a much clearer picture at the time they agree to
plead guilty of the likely sentence they will face. And the fact that
the prosecution would ultimately face the burden of proving
sentencing considerations beyond a reasonable doubt if the bargain
fails would confer even greater leverage on defendants.
Still, treating all of the Guidelines' offense-related factors as
elements to be pleaded and proved could represent a change so
radical as to be infeasible at this time. And again, for cases that
actually get to trial, defendants might not want all those factors to
be determined in conjunction with culpability. For these reasons, an
alternative approach might be preferable.
Treating all offense-related factors as elements to be pleaded in
the indictment might be required if the right to a jury decision
rested on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Winship, the case that requires all elements of a
criminal offense to be pleaded in an indictment and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, rested on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, not on the Sixth Amendment.333 Both Blakely and
Booker, however, rested expressly on the Sixth Amendment. The
Trial-by-Jury Clause of the Sixth Amendment has never been used
to justify procedural requirements with respect to pleading. As it
did in Apprendi, the Court in Blakely and Booker focused solely on
the requirement that the jury determine the facts resulting in an
increase in the defendant's sentence. It said nothing about pleading
requirements. Consequently, none of the Court's decisions compels
the conclusion that facts relevant to sentencing must be pleaded in
the indictment.
The question remains how to get fact questions that are pertinent
only to sentencing before the jury if they are not part of the offense
charged in the indictment. Probably the best answer is to bifurcate
the proceedings into culpability and sentencing phases, with the
jury issuing a general verdict of guilty or not guilty first, and then
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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answering a set of interrogatories regarding the offense-related
sentencing factors only if the initial verdict was guilty. Both state
and federal courts already use special interrogatories to determine
certain factual matters relevant to sentencing. For example, a
number of states have used special interrogatories in capital cases
to determine the existence of statutory aggravators warranting
death.334 The number of states using such procedures will surely
rise after Ring.335 Some states also require the jury to answer
special interrogatories where the presence of firearms is a sentenc-
ing factor not pleaded in the indictment.33 After Apprendi, some
federal district courts have used special interrogatories to determine
whether a statutory drug quantity is met.337 These examples
demonstrate that limited fact-finding by the jury for sentencing
purposes can be achieved without imposing unacceptable complexity
or cost.
If sentencing factors are not pleaded in the indictment, the
question arises of how to handle them in plea-bargained cases. But
that problem can be handled through waiver rules. Arguably, a
defendant should have a right to a jury decision on the sentencing
facts only if she had also demanded and received a jury trial on the
question of culpability. A defendant who has waived the right to a
jury trial on the question of culpability by pleading guilty could
reasonably be considered to have concomitantly waived the right as
334 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-603(a)(1)-(3) (Michie 1997) ("The jury shall impose a
sentence of death if it unanimously returns written findings that: (1) Aggravating
circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Aggravating circumstances outweigh
beyond a reasonable doubt all mitigating circumstances found to exist; and (3) Aggravating
circumstances justify a sentence of death beyond a reasonable doubt.").
' See Sim6n Cantarero, Comment, Who Makes the Call on Capital Punishment? How
Ring v. Arizona Clarifies the Apprendi Rule and the Implications on Capital Sentencing, 17
BYU J. PUB. L. 323, 337 (2003) (stating legislatures will reform capital sentencing standards
after Ring); Casey Laffey, Note, The Death Penalty and the Sixth Amendment: How Will the
System Look After Ring v. Arizona?, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 371, 382-91 (2003) (discussing
questions raised by Ring for other states).
336 See Kate H. Nepveu, Beyond "Guilty" or "Not Guilty": Giving Special Verdicts in
Criminal Jury Trials, 21 YALE L. & POLY REV. 263, 273-74 (2003) (listing states giving
firearms special interrogatories).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 114 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Becker,
C.J., concurring) ("Since Apprendi, federal district courts have proceeded in this manner,
submitting special interrogatories to the jury for determination of drug type and quantity,
and many have been operating in this manner since Jones.").
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to the determination of sentencing facts. 38 If such a rule were
adopted, then for the more than 90% of cases that end in plea
bargain, the sentencing process would not change at all. Another
alternative, which prosecutors used in the interval between Blakely
and Booker, is to require defendants to waive the right to a jury
decision on sentencing facts as a condition to entering into a plea
bargain.339 In either case, the judge could continue to determine the
sentencing facts on a preponderance of the evidence standard based
on the information in the presentence report.
The rules on waiver might also be modified in another way to
protect defendants from the negative effects of jury fact-finding at
sentencing. Defendants do not have a unilateral right to waive a
jury trial on the elements of an offense. But they should probably
have the right to waive the jury decision on the sentencing factors.
Where a defendant finds unpalatable the prospect of arguing for
leniency before a jury that has just convicted him, he should have
the option of submitting those issues to the judge to be decided
according to the usual sentencing procedures.
If implemented in this way, Blakely and its progeny would entail
much less sweeping revisions of criminal procedure than might at
first be assumed. In the vast majority of cases-all cases ending in
plea bargain plus all cases tried before a jury in which the defendant
waives the right to a jury determination of offense-related sentenc-
ing factors-the sentencing process will remain exactly as it stands.
But where the government conditions punishment on the answers
3M Cf CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4 (2004) (requiring trier of fact to make special finding of
truth of special circumstances statutorily required to impose death). The California statute
provides for a jury determination of those facts even if the defendant waived a jury trial or
accepted a plea bargain:
If the defendant was convicted by the court sitting without ajury, the trier
of fact shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant and by the
people, in which case the trier of fact shall be the court. If the defendant
was convicted by a plea of guilty, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a
jury is waived by the defendant and by the people.
Id.
339 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 758-64.
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given to fact questions--questions requiring inductive inferences
about the wrong of which the defendant is accused-a defendant
who wants a jury trial would have a jury decision on those ques-
tions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite superficial similarity in the civil and criminal jury, the
Supreme Court has, until recently, treated the right to a jury trial
in criminal cases as consisting of something markedly different from
the right to a jury trial in civil cases. The difference is manifest in
the parallel distinctions the Court has relied on in allocating
decisional responsibility in the criminal and civil contexts. In the
criminal context, the Court has traditionally given the determina-
tion of "elements" to the jury, while allowing judges to determine
"sentencing factors." In the civil context, the Court has given juries
the power to determine "facts," while allowing judges to decide
issues of "law." In practice, these semantic differences produced
concrete discrepancies in the issues criminal and civil litigants can
expect a jury to resolve. The same questions for which a civil
litigant could demand a jury decision, such as in the determination
of punitive damages, would go to the judge if the case fell on the
criminal side of the docket.
That makes no sense. If anything, criminal defendants should be
able to demand a broader scope of decisionmaking for the jury than
civil litigants. But what makes the most sense in this context is to
interpret the scope of the jury right to include the determination of
the same types of questions, regardless of whether the case is
considered civil or criminal. In Blakely v. Washington, the Court
took an important step in that direction by holding that any fact
that increases the maximum allowable sentence must be admitted
by the defendant or found by the jury.34° In United States v. Booker,
however, the Court eviscerated that principle by holding that judges
can continue to determine questions of fact at sentencing as long as
they are not required to do so by Congress.341 To fulfill the promise
340 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
341 See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
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of the Sixth Amendment to criminal defendants, a greater role for
the jury is required. A criminal defendant should have a right to a
jury decision on all questions requiring inductive inferences about
the wrong of which the defendant is accused, whether those
inferences come up in the liability or sentencing phase of the
prosecution.
Implemented in the way I suggest, this approach will require
relatively modest procedural changes. In order to give full effect to
the jury right, defendants who invoke their right to a jury trial and
have a jury trial on the issue of culpability should also have a
waiveable right to a jury determination on offense-related sentenc-
ing factors. But the relevant facts should not necessarily be pleaded
in the indictment, and if a defendant waives the right to a jury trial
on the issue of culpability, the defendant should also be understood
to waive the right to a jury decision on sentencing facts. This
proposal will result in a jury right that is consistent for both
criminal and civil litigants and that ensures juries decide the
questions they are best suited to decide. And it will achieve these
objectives in a way that will not unnecessarily alter the basic
processes of the criminal justice system or unduly tax that system's
resources.
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